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BARON FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL AND HIS CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB
OXFORD UNIVERSITY

'CETTE GRANDE personnalité chrétienne': the phrase, applied to him by a Swiss theologian, M. Guiran, is rightly fixed upon by M. Loisy in his Mémoires as the *mot juste* in describing Friedrich von Hügel. In language no less well chosen the same writer has gone on to speak of those 'valeurs intimes et profondes que M. von Hügel a si magnifiquement et si humblement incarnées.' For it was indeed not by the construction of a system that von Hügel promoted our understanding of religious experience, nor even chiefly by originating or giving currency to new and fruitful ideas in this department of study, but rather by the impression made by his unforgettable personality upon those who were brought into contact with it, whether through actual conversation or correspondence with him during his lifetime or through the reading of what he wrote and stamped with the peculiar and distinctive style in which that personality found so characteristic an expression. Therefore, while in the case of any thinker who takes as the subject of his lucubrations one which, like religion, must be comprehended, if at all, by an experience in which the whole man is engaged, some acquaintance with his biography will perhaps be found necessary to the understanding of his thought; in the case of such a thinker as he of whom I am now to speak to you it is certainly indispensable. To paint in words — as a Thomas Carlyle might have done — a picture of Friedrich von Hügel 'in his habit as he lived' is indeed very far beyond my capacity, and I shall make no attempt to do anything of the sort; but I can mention the main facts of the story of his life, and indicate the influence which they exerted over the direction of his thoughts and over his choice of those factors in religion upon which he judged it to be his special mission to lay stress.

Carl von Hügel, the father of Friedrich, was the representative of a family which had originally belonged to the Rhineland, and had himself passed into the diplomatic service of Austria, being at the time of his son's birth on May 8, 1852, Austrian minister at the court of the Grand Duke of Tuscany in Florence. Friedrich's mother was a lady of Scottish birth, and he himself was brought up in infancy in Italian surroundings and early impressed with a sentiment of sympathy for the cause of Italian unity. At the age of eight he was transferred to Brussels by his father's appointment to represent Austria at that capital, and thence, at fifteen, after his father's retirement from the diplomatic service, to Torquay in England. This cosmopolitan upbringing was supplemented by what to a child of his strong religious instincts must have been exceptional opportunities of becoming acquainted with the atmosphere of religious environments other than that of the Roman Catholic Church, as a member of which he was brought up, his father having always been a Roman Catholic and his mother having after her marriage passed from Scottish Presbyterianism into her husband's communion. For his teachers in boyhood were Miss Redmayne, a Protestant lady, who was a friend of his mother's and a member of the Church of England; a German Lutheran tutor; and the then Prussian Minister at Brussels, Alfred von Reumont, a Roman Catholic; while he was initiated into the science of geology, in which he never ceased to be interested, by a man of eminence in his day, William Pengelly, an English Quaker. He went to no school, nor did he study at any University; and, after his father's death in 1872, he was attacked by typhus fever and, although he survived this illness, never recovered his hearing or to the end of his life enjoyed good health. It is possible to trace alike in his habits of thought and in his literary style the effects both of his deafness and of his lack of the experience of an education in common with youths of his own age in an institution with a fixed curriculum.

While staying in Vienna after his illness von Hügel went through a period of crisis, in which it would seem that he was in danger not only of losing his religious faith but of grave moral lapse — a danger his deliverance from which he always attributed to the spiritual help received from two priests, from the

Dutch Dominican Father Raymond Hocking at Vienna and later on from the Abbé Huvelin at Paris, a remarkable man with a singular gift of insight into character, to whose saintliness and wisdom M. Loisy, no indulgent judge of pretensions to such qualities, has borne in his Mémoires emphatic testimony. He acknowledged also a lasting indebtedness for guidance at this stage of his career to certain French Jesuit Fathers and to the celebrated William George Ward, the friend of Tennyson, who, having been perhaps the most philosophically cultivated among the leaders of the Oxford movement in the Anglican Church, had become a Roman Catholic and so zealous a supporter of the papal claims that the moderation of the assertion of them in the Vatican Council's definition of infallibility was a disappointment to him; yet a recognition of these obligations did not win von Hügel to sympathy either with Ward's ultramontanism or with the ecclesiastical policy of the great Society to which his French friends belonged.

This time of struggle ended with his marriage in 1873 to an English lady, a convert to Roman Catholicism. For twenty years after this event he lived a quiet and scholarly life, with his home in England but usually wintering abroad in the south of Europe, and known only to a small circle of private friends. A common interest in biblical studies brought him during the last decade of the nineteenth century into contact with those who within his own communion were engaged in promoting those studies and who were discontented with the indifference or hostility manifested by the ecclesiastical authorities toward the new light which had been shed by the progress of historical criticism and scientific enquiry upon the interpretation of the sacred Scriptures. His high social position and the easy relations which his cosmopolitan training and connections enabled him to cultivate with scholars and theologians of various nations and confessions combined with his singularly impressive and sympathetic personality to place him at the centre of the group to which the name of 'modernist' came to be attached, and of which the late Paul Sabatier, the well known biographer of St. Francis of Assisi, described him as 'the lay bishop,' and a less sympathetic observer, Salomon Reinach, as 'the pope.' It was in the middle of the decade already men-

tioned that, through his membership of several societies formed in England for the study of religion and its philosophical implications, especially the 'Synthetic Society,' of which Arthur Balfour, Bishop Talbot of Winchester, and Wilfrid Ward were the founders, and where I first met him — he and I were both among its original members. The influence of von Hügel gradually spread to a wider circle, and, before the end of the first decade of the present century, the publication of his first book, that on The Mystical Element of Religion as studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and her Friends, established his reputation as a learned as well as a highly original and stimulating exponent of a subject which for various reasons was attracting at that period the attention of many thoughtful persons — that of mysticism. I shall speak hereafter of the subsequent movement of his mind towards an ever increasing emphasis on the transcendence of God and away from the immanentism by which many of his modernist friends in his own Church (especially after the condemnation of modernism by Pope Pius X in the encyclical Pascendi of 1907) were being led to abandon to a greater or less degree their attachment to Catholic and in some cases even to Christian tradition. In the meantime I hope that the brief sketch which I have given of von Hügel's earlier career will seem to supply an intelligible background to the remarks which I shall go on to offer on the contribution to the philosophy of religion made by the man whose character had been thus moulded, when the matured fruit of many years' study, reflection and experience in a mind and soul of rare depth and comprehension appeared in the essays and addresses, the books and letters of the last period of his life, which was closed by his death in 1925.

The student of the history of religious thought in Europe during the nineteenth century will note that a tendency in the direction of what, to use a word which, in a disparaging sense, was frequently on the lips of Friedrich von Hügel during his later years, may be called *immanentism*, is a feature generally characteristic of the period. The religious values which an earlier generation had regarded as in themselves belonging altogether to another world than this, and as revealed in this world only by way of a supernatural intervention from that higher sphere,

whether through a divinely authorized hierarchy, through an infallible record of divine acts and words, or through an illumination of individual minds by a ray from the divine source of light — these religious values were now sought rather *within* the secular civilization in which it had formerly been customary to see a mere transitory scene of human probation, the concern of each individual in which must end with his death, and which must pass away like smoke at the wholly uncertain — and possibly quite imminent — date of a catastrophic 'last day' of divine judgment. This new orientation was displayed alike by the Romantic movement of the early nineteenth century and by the revolutionary Socialism of its middle and later years, by the idealistic philosophy of the successors of Kant, and by the naturalistic Positivism to which that philosophy might seem to have been diametrically opposed. The rise of historical criticism and of anthropological research under the inspiration of the idea of evolution which, already made current by the thought of Goethe and Hegel, had received an immense impulse from Darwin's great discovery of a verifiable *modus operandi* in the instance of the origin of organic species, had moreover aided the tendency of which I am speaking, by calling in question the traditional account of the origins of the sacred books and institutions of Christendom and subverting their claim to be regarded as without parallel or kindred among the religious systems of the world.

To understand the position of von Hügel in regard to the tendency of nineteenth century thought on the subject of religion which I have been endeavoring to describe, it is necessary to observe that the effect of that tendency upon the general religious outlook was twofold. On the one hand it engendered a loss of confidence in the possibility of proving the existence of God by such arguments as Kant so severely criticized in his Critique of Pure Reason, arguments drawn from considerations independent of any specifically religious experience, and, having thus proved his existence, inferring thence the reasonableness of religion. For a defence of religion conducted on those lines it substituted an appeal to the intrinsic evidence of the value of religion as directly experienced by the believing soul. In this way the 'immanentist' tendency of thought led to an emphasis on religion not as a means

to happiness in a world demonstrably or probably governed by a Being who required of us worship as an acknowledgment of his supremacy, but as of itself satisfying an inborn need of human nature. On the other hand the same tendency to immanentism suggested that in the satisfaction of such an innate human need lay the whole justification of religion and the adequate explanation of its presence in human life, so that it could be accounted for as a product of human evolution without involving the recognition of any Reality transcending human nature of which in religion we are conscious or aware.

Now the movement called Modernism within the Roman Catholic Church, with which, in its earlier stages, Friedrich von Hügel stood in such intimate relations, aimed, as its popular name suggests, at reconciling the theology and policy of that Church with the principles of thought and conduct which were characteristic of the period in which it arose — and that notwithstanding the explicit denunciation by Pope Pius IX in his celebrated Syllabus, issued in 1864, of the view that such a reconciliation could be regarded by faithful Catholics as in itself a desirable object. It was animated by the conviction that there was much to be learned from the philosophers who had broken away from the tradition of the mediaeval schools and from the scholars who had applied to the records of the Christian religion — even to those included within the canon of Scripture — the same principles of criticism as had revolutionized the study of profane history and literature. It was prepared to follow a great English Roman Catholic whose innovations in apologetic method had themselves been received with none too warm a welcome by ecclesiastical authority — John Henry Newman — in applying to the interpretation of theological dogma that conception of development or evolution which had in the middle of the nineteenth century become the 'ruling idea' of all the sciences concerned with living beings, and which such writers as Herbert Spencer had even attempted to extend to the explanation of inorganic phenomena.

Now in his readiness to accept and appropriate the assured results of genuine scientific investigation, whether in natural science, in history, or in philosophy, however discordant these might be with traditional beliefs; and also in his readiness to use

the idea of evolution or development as a clue to the understanding, as of other activities of the human spirit, so also of religion; in both these respects von Hügel was and always continued to be a 'modernist.' In the particular department of enquiry which was at once that with which his own studies were especially concerned, and also that in regard to which the risk of conflict with ecclesiastical authority was greatest, the department namely of biblical criticism, he never failed loyally to follow whithersoever the argument seemed to him to lead, and was to the end wholly 'impenitent' (as he once said to me) in his adherence to modern critical views of the sacred books. It was at a moment when he had great reason to fear that these views might bring down on all who held them a censure from the possible consequences of which he, with his profound loyalty to this Church and his passionate attachment to her sacraments, could but shrink with horror, that he published in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911) an article on the Fourth Gospel in which he followed his friend Loisy to the extent of denying to it any independent historical value as a record of the life of Jesus.

In von Hügel's philosophy of religion this 'modernism' of his is represented by his constant emphasis on the autonomy of other forms of spiritual life over against religion and of religion over against other forms of spiritual life. In this part of his teaching he is plainly a child of the age whose 'immanentist' tendency I described earlier. For he hereby recognizes the value of art, science, morality as *intrinsic*, and not as primarily subservient or instrumental to the transcendent ends proposed by a revelation from another world than this; while correspondingly the value of religion itself is found in its *intrinsic* character as a form of experience irreducible to any other, and is not inferred from proofs, open to the religious and irreligious alike, which establish the existence of an intelligent Ruler of the universe.

It is moreover not to be overlooked that von Hügel's position is here a 'modernist' position not only in the sense indicated by the derivation of the word, of congruity with the tendencies of contemporary thought in general, but also in the specifically historical sense which it bears as the title of a movement within the Roman Catholic Church. For von Hügel closely associates his

view with the traditional recognition by Roman Catholic theology of a *natural* life ordained by God for man, with its own claims, its own value or goodness, and its own reward, distinct from those of the *supernatural* life which man is also called and enabled to live by that intervention of God, as it were from without, in human affairs, whereof his incarnation in Jesus Christ is the culmination.

In the rejection by the Churches of the Reformation of the 'double standard' involved in the mediaeval recognition of a 'religious' life ordered in accordance with the evangelical 'counsels' of perfection and segregated from the secular life, which aimed only at obeying the 'precepts' necessary to salvation — in this rejection von Hügel saw an attempt to deny the rightful claims of the 'natural' life to a relative independence of religion. The upholding of the distinction between the 'natural' and the 'supernatural' which was expressed in the maintenance by the Roman Church of the technically 'religious' or monastic life he regarded as a safeguard of the autonomy of our non-religious activities, an autonomy which was in his opinion endangered by the type of view commonly described as 'Puritan,' a type of view which, though it might sometimes have manifested itself even within the Roman Catholic Church, was, he thought, the legitimate outcome of that Protestant insistence on a 'single standard' of Christian conduct which had resulted in the general disappearance of monastic institutions from the life of Protestant churches.

It must however be observed that von Hügel gave to the word 'supernatural' in this connection a wider denotation than would probably be allowed to it by many Roman Catholics. In a remarkable address to young men delivered at Oxford — I was myself in the chair on the occasion — and subsequently published among his Essays and Addresses, while not denying the occurrence of miracles, he not only refused to identify the 'supernatural' with the miraculous, but included among his instances of the former a number of cases of heroic conduct which were neither explicitly concerned with the Christian religion nor even in all cases exhibited by Christian believers. Such were the devotion of a dying astronomer to his task of recording his observations of the transit of Venus, and the courage of a Jewish rabbi

who, in the first world war, amid a hail of bullets, held up before the eyes of a dying Catholic soldier the image of Christ upon the cross. It is not improbable, considering the mutual respect and friendship which existed between Friedrich von Hügel and the German philosopher Rudolf Eucken, that there is something more than coincidence in the resemblance, which will strike those acquainted with the writings of both, between von Hügel's doctrine of the 'supernatural' in the address to which I have been referring and Eucken's description in his Wahrheit der Religion of the love of one's enemies, which is prescribed in the Gospel, as by itself affording sufficient evidence of the presence in the world of a higher life than can be adequately accounted for on purely naturalistic principles. But, whether due or not to influence exerted by one of these thinkers on the other, the resemblance in their views illustrates the fact that von Hügel's criterion of the 'supernatural' was found by him in the *intrinsic* character of the actions to which he applied the term and not in their external association with the historic revelation which he notwithstanding held to have been in fact given to man through Christ and his Church. Thus in this matter von Hügel is still in line with what I have called the 'immanentist' tendency which is observable in the religious thought of the nineteenth century generally, and in particular in the 'Modernist' movement which aimed at domesticating the issues of that thought within the Roman Catholic communion.

We find them in von Hügel's teaching respecting the autonomy of the various distinct forms of spiritual life over against religion and of religion over against them a contribution to the philosophy of religion which he may be said to have made as a 'modernist.' One who was the most prominent of his fellow modernists but who eventually ceased to be a modernist because, unlike von Hügel, he altogether abandoned hope in the possibility of a reconciliation between the Roman Church as now organized and the freedom of thought requisite to genuine historical investigation — I mean, of course, M. Alfred Loisy — has criticized this teaching of von Hügel's on the ground that *all* our spiritual activities should be infused by a religious spirit. This I take it that von Hügel would by no means have denied; but his view of religion

was really a very different one from Loisy's insofar as he regarded it as being (to use a saying of his which has often been quoted) essentially *adoration*, and thus as having a distinctive sphere of its own apart from any other in which the religious man may also exhibit the temper which he has acquired in his experience of adoration, just as the scientific man may and should carry into his religion the self-discounting, objective habit of mind which he has cultivated in his laboratory. It was moreover precisely in this connection that von Hügel was led to propound what is perhaps the most original and fruitful idea with which he has enriched the philosophy of religion. The slighting reference to this idea in M. Loisy's Mémoires does but illustrate the incapacity of that distinguished scholar to appreciate a mind fundamentally uncongenial to his own.

The idea in question is that of the part which may be played by the deterministic outlook of modern science in purifying religion. Von Hügel was keenly alive to a certain danger besetting such a religion as Christianity (with its emphasis on the love of God for individual persons and their capacity for response to that love), and especially in the form assumed by it in the Roman Catholic system, which he so highly valued and to which he was so devotedly attached, with its encouragement in the believer of a childlike intimacy and intercourse with the heavenly Father, the Saviour, and the saints. This danger was that of an unqualified anthropomorphism, which would rob the religious man's outlook of that seriousness and humility which comes from a realization of his littleness and powerlessness in the presence of a universe governed by laws which take no account of our trivial desires and plans, and by the irresistible operation of which our whole world is at every moment liable to be overwhelmed. In former times the traditional eschatology had provided a correction in this respect for the factors in Christian piety which exposed it to the danger in question. At any moment there might, it was held, burst upon humanity the 'day of judgment,' whose date, although preordained from eternity in the divine counsels, is for us as uncertain as its future occurrence at some date is certain. Civilization had, in the view of the elder Church, no such value of its own as could entitle it to endure one moment beyond

the point up to which it might subserve a divine purpose which remained essentially 'other' than the achievement of its immediate end of facilitating or enriching the life of human beings under earthly conditions. The second coming of Christ might cut its existence short at any moment, just as the individual's death might at any moment put an end to his particular career.

The waning of belief in this traditional eschatology owing to the difficulty of reconciling it with the outlook of modern natural science might, it is plain, easily tend to deprive religion of factors with which it could ill dispense — the sense of the transiency and comparative unimportance of this life and of the helplessness of humanity in the presence of infinite and eternal realities.

But, so von Hügel was wont to suggest, the very science which had weakened the faith of Christians in the apocalyptic pictures of 'that day of wrath, that dreadful day' which had haunted the imagination of their fathers — those very sciences were providing a substitute which might, even better than those pictures, perform for religion the same service that they had formerly rendered. For the world-order and the world-process as revealed by modern science, with an extension in space immeasurably vaster than any which Christian tradition attributed to the 'heaven and earth' which God created, and a duration in time immeasureably more prolonged than any which it contemplated for that creation, far more effectually dwarf the scale of the scene on which the drama of human life is played than they could as imagined by our forefathers. So also the determinism which is assumed — or at least until the other day was assumed — as a necessary presupposition of scientific investigation involves a more utter indifference to human values than that which was implied in the old doctrine of predestination, since it excludes any miraculous intervention by a Creator and any ultimate reference to the lot awarded by divine justice and mercy to human beings. Nowhere then could the Christian better learn to think of God's nature and designs as infinitely transcending any picture which, under the influence of a faith in his revelation of himself through Christ and the Church, might be made of them as relative to our individual lives and purposes. Thus the Christian can use the scientific outlook to chasten and purify his religious

imagination and to attain, it may be, to a belief in the reality of divine providence and in the eternal significance of human personality which shall not be exposed to the contempt nowadays so lightheartedly bestowed by novelists and essayists on what they suppose to be the Christian doctrines of God and man as dreams impossible for men who are alive to the discoveries of modern science. Yet in so using science the Christian will not be ignoring that autonomy of each of the various spheres of our spiritual activity, religion included, on which von Hügel was so much concerned to lay stress. For the assistance which science may offer to religion is only available just so far as the religious man has immersed himself in the scientific view of the world, without making any attempt to qualify it by alien considerations borrowed from the sphere of religion. For only so will he come to the consideration of the data of religious experience which demand the recognition of personality in God and of a significance in man transcending that which can be allowed to him when regarded merely as one of the species of organism evolved upon this planet, with a mind fully familiarized with those aspects of reality which are most difficult to reconcile with those data. But no reconciliation of aspects of reality which are at first sight in mutual contradiction can even begin to promise satisfaction to an honest thinker which does not give its fullest weight to the witness which each aspect affords to the ultimate character of the reality of which either is alike an aspect.

If however in this brilliant and profound suggestion of von Hügel's that modern science may discharge for the religion of today the function which the traditional eschatology attempted to perform for that of an earlier generation there is nothing uncongenial to the principles of Modernism, we may yet legitimately see in it an indication of that turn of mind in its author which eventually led him to appear less as an exponent than as a critic of the movement which he had done so much to foster. For this suggestion is obviously inspired by a profound sense of man's insignificance in the presence of God and of the indispensableness to religion of a whole-hearted recognition of God's transcendence of humanity. This sense made von Hügel the convinced opponent of a line of thought, present in the nineteenth

century philosophy of religion, which found its most representative exponent in Feuerbach, of whom in this capacity he published a penetrating criticism under the title 'Religion and Illusion.' However developed, whether as by absolute idealists, by sociologists of the school of Durkheim, or by so called 'new' psychologists, any denial of divine transcendence, any obliteration or minimization of the distinction between the human spirit and the divine came to figure in von Hügel's later teaching under the name of 'immanentism' as the grand enemy of true religion in theory and in practice alike.

But the transcendence of God did not in von Hügel's view stand alone. Religion was ultimately interested in maintaining everywhere the genuine reality of the object of human apprehension; and he would certainly have himself regarded as his main contribution to the philosophy of religion his emphasis upon the importance of recognizing here as elsewhere the independence of the object upon the mental process by which it is apprehended.

It was precisely at this point that von Hügel's philosophy diverged from that associated with the 'Modernist' movement. That movement had originated in a revolt against the cramping restrictions imposed upon freedom of thought in the Roman Catholic Church by the reluctance of the ecclesiastical authorities to permit departures from established tradition. But in philosophy (especially after the encyclical of Leo XIII Aeterni Patris, issued in 1879) the established tradition meant the tradition of mediaeval Scholasticism. Now the outstanding feature by which Scholasticism is distinguished from the later philosophy which looked to Descartes as its patriarch was precisely its maintenance of that independence of the object of knowledge upon the knowing subject which to common sense and to classical antiquity alike had appeared to be involved in the very nature of knowledge, but which was called in question by the speculation the starting point of which was the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum*. It was not surprising therefore that, by reaction from Scholasticism, a tendency should have manifested itself in modernism to move in the direction of the subjectivism which was at the time of its appearance producing philosophies of religion which dwelt

upon its biological value rather than upon its ontological validity, and which reflected in theology the way of thinking which was contemporaneously taking shape in the so called 'Pragmatism' of William James. The encyclical Pascendi, although, in attributing to Modernists a greater uniformity of philosophical opinion than was as a matter of fact to be found among them, it was doubtless unjust to individuals, was not mistaken in its diagnosis of the speculative affinities of much Modernism.

Von Hügel, however, although in sympathy with his fellow-modernists in their aspirations after emancipation from the yoke of the scholastic tradition and freedom to appropriate the gains of the great philosophical movement of the last three centuries, was yet profoundly convinced that the subjectivist trend perceptible in that movement was mistaken, and that a fruitful interpretation of religion, and indeed of spiritual life generally, must emphasize the necessity of recognizing in the *object* — in the physical world, in living things, in persons, in God — a genuine reality of its own over against the subject, the apprehending mind. 'All and every monism' (the phrase is von Hügel's own) must lead, be held, in proportion as it is taken seriously, to the impoverishment of the experience for which it endeavors to account. His insistence (in agreement with Aristotle and St. Thomas) on the indispensableness of sensation as the starting point of all experience; his stress on the need for religion in particular of historical facts and outward institutions and sacramental means of grace; on the incarnation of God in Christ; on the prevenience of God; on adoration as constituting the essence of religion; all these features of his teaching hang together. Although his great work on the 'Mystical Element in Religion' established his reputation as an authority on mysticism, he was not himself in the strict sense of the word a mystic. The born mystic is animated by passion for union with the object of religious worship, and even the mystic most humbly loyal to his religious confession is with difficulty restrained from transgressing the bounds of orthodoxy in identification of the soul with God at the highest or deepest level of its life. But this passion was far less marked in von Hügel than his keen sense of dependence from first to last upon Another than himself. Moreover, we do

not find in his analysis of religion the mystical type of devotion sufficiently distinguished from that which Professor Heiler has called the prophetic. The 'mystical element' is by von Hügel considered as embracing all that is emotional and inward in religion over against the 'institutional' and 'intellectual' elements, and one consequently misses in him an adequate study of that type of piety which can perhaps be more easily illustrated from the records of Protestant communions than from those of the Church to which he belonged — that, I mean, which is exemplified in England by such names as those of Bunyan, Wesley, Cowper — intensely individual, inward, emotional, but *not* inspired by the properly mystic desire to *lose* oneself in God. In piety of this type, when his attention was called to it, Von Hügel was apt to miss (as also in the mystics strictly so called) an adequate sense of its actual dependence at every point upon historical happenings, traditions and institutions, the importance of which it was inclined, in the consciousness of its spiritual freedom and direct access to God, unduly to disparage. He himself on the other hand was always vividly aware of such dependence and was disposed to testify his gratitude to the channels through which God's grace had reached him in a joyful conformity, wherever his conscience permitted it, even with customs of his Church (such as the use of the rosary) which in themselves meant little to him, if such conformity might intensify his sense of unity with his fellow Churchmen in their worship of his God and theirs.

This orientation of his thought and feeling inevitably parted him more and more from those who were moving in an opposite direction. It would be quite unjust to see in his later development merely the result of his desire not to be cut off, as were some of his friends, from participation in the sacraments of his Church. Greatly as he shrank from the prospect of such a deprivation, he would have faced it, even though with agony, if he had been presented with the alternative of denying his conscientious convictions or enduring excommunication. That he escaped being presented with this alternative and was thus spared what would have been a bitter martyrdom he probably owed, to a degree of which he was perhaps not fully aware, to his high social position

and to the respect which he enjoyed among influential persons not of his own communion. But if, as has been written of him by one of his friends, he was a saint but not a martyr — if it be even true that he did not court martyrdom — yet there is no reason for supposing that, had he been offered it, he would have declined the palm. His ever deepening conviction, to which I have already referred, that in doubting the independence of the object of knowledge upon the knowing subject, modern philosophy had taken a wrong path, naturally led him to set more and more value on the scholastic assertion of this principle, and so to put him out of sympathy with any undiscriminating rejection of a tradition which was bound up with the championship of what was in his eyes so important a truth. Thus, just as he showed a special sympathy with the realistic reaction against a lately dominant absolute idealism, a reaction which he noted as in progress in Great Britain during the last twenty years of his life, so he came to exalt the 'golden middle age,' as he was wont to call it, even above the Catholic Renaissance which had attracted him more in earlier days and to which his heroine St. Catherine of Genoa belonged. But he never, that I know of, withdrew his definite preference of pre-Tridentine Catholicism to that of the period which ensued upon the definitive parting at Trent between the Roman communion and the Churches which seceded from it at the Reformation. So again the loss by many of those who had been his allies in the first days of the Modernist movement of a hold on what he considered to be essential truths of philosophy and religion made him set yet greater store, if that were possible, upon the help towards retaining a hold upon them which continued contact with the ecclesiastical tradition afforded to himself. But there was no lack of consistency in his later teaching with that doctrine of the autonomy of the various species of non-religious spiritual activity over against religion and of religion over against them which expressed the ground of his adhesion to the modernist movement. This he held to the end, seeing (not without justification) in the 'immanentism' which he criticized in some of his friends, a denial of the autonomy of religion and an advance toward a subjectivism which must in the long run deny that which he took to be the

very essence of religion, namely the adoration which presupposes the transcendent reality of its object.

Von Hügel's main contribution to the philosophy of religion is thus his insistence on the transcendence of God as essential to religion, and this against the background of a philosophical realism which everywhere acknowledges the independence of the object of knowledge upon the process by and in which it is known. There is nothing in this incompatible with the Modernism which had been his; for this was an insistence on the mutual distinctness and several autonomy of the different species of spiritual activity. And with this von Hügel's doctrine of transcendence is more harmonious than is any subjectivism or idealistic monism such as he suspected to be involved in what he called the 'immanentism' of some of his friends; and indeed the antimodernism of the Italian philosophers Croce and Gentile is certainly closely connected with their philosophical monism.

On the other hand we must note the affinity of von Hügel's doctrine of divine transcendence with that of writers such as Otto, Barth, and Brunner, who in quite recent times have reacted against the immanentism of nineteenth century theology; while recognizing that von Hügel is wholly exempt from what I think is an unfortunate tendency present in some of the most vigorous theological thought of today, the tendency so to sever the revelation of God in Christ from that in the general spiritual development of humanity that we seem to be pushed back into that very position against which the Modernism which found a leader in von Hügel was essentially a reaction. In von Hügel's judgment it was an advantage possessed by Roman Catholic theology over Protestant that it could, he thought, give a more unqualified welcome to elements derived from other sources than that of the revelation whereof the Bible is the record, and a heartier recognition to the natural life of man as having a value of its own distinct from that of the supernatural and necessary to the full realization of the value of the latter. I do not desire in this place either to endorse or to dispute this view, but it was because he held it that von Hügel was at once a protagonist of the earlier and a critic of the later views of some who were allied with him in one of the most important movements in the recent

history of religion, on the issues of which it is reserved for another generation than mine to pronounce a final judgment.

I began by saying that Friedrich von Hügel was above all a great Christian personality, yet now that I am ending, I find that I have discussed his views but done nothing to put before you the man himself. Nevertheless, while I have been speaking, I have always been seeing the lineaments of a face, hearing the tones of a voice, feeling the inspiration of a presence which, once familiar, can never be forgotten, and which, beyond those of any man that I have known, by the witness which they bore to the depth, the richness, the intellectual and moral discipline, the balance and sanity of the religious experience expressed therein, impressed upon his friends that great conviction which he had hoped in the book he left unfinished to bring home to his contemporaries, of the 'Reality of God.'

LIGHT FROM THE QUEST

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Many years ago, to a student who had made what to him and to the rest of the class seemed a sensible guess as to the origin in the misty past of a practice still in vogue, the teacher, an eminent anthropologist, made what was to me a memorable reply. Said he in substance, "When we are probing back into antiquity we need be ever on our guard against the fallacy that what seems to us rational or sensible or practical would have so seemed to them. Thus it has been my experience that when seeking to explain the origin of a practice which still continues, but with no real indication as to what started it, of all the various possible guesses the one which seems to us most 'sensible' or 'reasonable' is the one to be most resolutely excluded. Because a practice so appears to us is no guarantee that it would so have appeared to men under totally different circumstances, whose notion of the world was totally different from our own; in fact, it is usually a guarantee that the exact opposite would be the case."

That remark seemed to me then profoundly wise, and I have seen no reason to alter that judgment; instead through the years I have found my own thinking definitely influenced by it. It is by no means the only tool which the historian of the far past will employ — it warns him away from what is likely to be a wrong surmise rather than indicating, except at times by indirection, what is likely to have been true — but its absence from his kit is likely to prove serious.

Its almost constant disregard in a chapter of the history of mankind of particular interest to me appears to me very serious. The chapter to which I allude is that of the origin and development of Christianity, and more especially that part of it devoted to its central figure, Jesus Christ. It is a commonplace which could easily be proved, as few hypotheses of the so-called inexact sciences can ever hope to be, that while much, perhaps most, of the history of that strangely compelling but bafflingly elusive figure has gone, never to be recaptured, each age, from his to ours, has rewritten and rethought the story in terms of its own

longings and dreams. Nor am I inclined to be overcensorious In the course of that process there has been an unbroken continuance of mighty consequence of the lovely legend which from almost the beginning symbolized the compulsive power he has exerted on his followers. I mean, of course, the story of the Magi with their gifts of gold, frankincense, and myrrh.

Whatever may be the truth behind the ancient word which stands secure in the first chapter of Genesis, "And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them," it can scarcely be denied that it is far from being the whole truth. The precisely opposite statement, while perhaps never crystallized in words as such until day before yesterday, is nevertheless far from being a modern discovery. The early Greeks, to cite but one, were ever convinced of its truth, and their religion, without which Christianity would have been distinctly the poorer, was the natural consequence of this profound and wholesome insight. Christianity could well paraphrase and misapply in the familiar way to herself Paul's haunting word of conviction of mission and responsibility, "I am debtor both to Greeks and barbarians," for in sober truth, quite apart from her sense of mission and conquest to bring the whole world in subjection at the feet of her imperious Lord, she stands alike debtor to cloud-topped Sinai and to "violet-crowned, illustrious Athens," foster mother to myriads of worthy sons. From the former comes her confidence that she has a revelation, a divine one given her by the Almighty himself, and of which she is to be alike the custodian and envoy; from the latter, quite unworried by any sense of obligation, to whom the word or notion of *revelation* in the sense of the Semitic East was quite unknown, she has learned to make her gods in her own image, or better said, in the image of what she ever hopes to become. In a word, the thousands of Lives of Jesus — some written in books, others painted on canvas, carved in marble, formed in multicolored glass, immortalized in song — all reflect or envisage the hopes and dreams and aspirations of the several authors.

From the point of view of prosy history, concerned alone with the capture and exhibition of a figure from the long dead past, these attempts have all been failures. They are not — any of

them — snapshots, photographs of the one they seek to reveal. Instead they are portraits painted in the several media by the different artists, and into each portrait each artist has painted, as true artists always do, much more than that which his physical eye could see or his instruments weigh or appraise. In a word, he has painted in a part of himself, his sense of values, his wistful longings, his unfulfilled dreams, and not infrequently along with these, his confidence that while for him and his fellows the story is apt to be tragic, that "swift to its close ebbs out life's little day," and that change and decay and ultimate darkness seem the unbroken rule, this is not the complete story; that instead there have been a chosen few whose feet stood firm though myriads of others tottered and fell, thus proving for all time the legitimacy of the common longing and serving as the earnest of its realization. This appears to me a part, at least, of what is involved in the traditional phrase, "the Christ of faith." And, as I have said, I see very profound values in it. Without it we should be a deal the poorer.

But it is nonetheless only a part of the story. To equate this with the companion piece, "the Jesus of history," as has been so frequently done through the years, results in an almost total perversion of the facts. I say "almost," for I should hesitate to deny the possibility that a man's biography is not concluded with his last breath on earth. With this confession I am far from intending to suggest what is generally included in the conventional arcana of mysteries entitled "Immortality." It is simply that I would hesitate to close another door too precipitously or too tight. A later generation may, and not infrequently does, discover imperishable values in what did not so appear to those to whom it was first revealed. And without this later chapter no adequate or even true biography can be penned. To cite but one example, Rembrandt was a colossal artist even though some of his fellow citizens proved so sadly blind. And his canvases, quite untouched by any process parallel to that which I have hinted in previous paragraphs, commend themselves to us and will continue to be fought for and prized.

Thus the longer I work with the pages which seek to tell the first chapters of the Christian story, the more confident I become

that, if I may continue the figure, many of the canvases painted by the original artist himself would, could we see them, commend themselves to us today even as do the canvases of the gifted seventeenth-century son of Leyden. I would be inclined to go a bit farther and perhaps incur the charge of irreverence, even blasphemy. Stories are told of Rembrandt which may or may not be true, which at any rate his admirers are not inclined to high-light. Quite regardless of their truth or untruth, his canvases remain unaffected. We see them and prize them for what they were and are.

It would be surprising were it other for Jesus of Nazareth. I confess that the heated arguments and apologias which used to be more common about his sinlessness, his perfection, all seem to me of little consequence. Unless we deny completely what appears to me a cardinal, if not the most central, confidence of the centuries — I mean, that of the completeness of the incarnation — such efforts and discussions must be labored and artificial. Thus to examine stories, which though ancient are yet in varying degree traditional, and to seek to free them of what might seem human weaknesses, appears to me a sheer waste of effort. I am thinking of such touches, over which much ink has been spilled and argument misspent as, Was Jesus' word to his mother at Cana's feast the natural word of a dutiful son? Did his word to the mother within the borders of Tyre and Sidon evidence the ecumenical spirit which many of his followers would today like to find? Is the attempt to tone down that latter brusque word to a wish to test her faith anything more than a trivial and unimpressive toying? Of the several words attributed to him, did those apparently addressed to the religious leaders of his day square with the other equally unqualified forbiddal: "Judge not, that ye be not judged"? These, and many others, all seem to me pointless and the blind following of the blind, with only an open ditch as the natural consequence. Of course we sing with Samuel Stennett — at least I do —

> "No mortal can with him compare
> Among the sons of men;
> Fairer is he than all the fair
> That fill the heavenly train";

but does it thereby follow that those words, or their companions,

> "He's the lily of the valley,
> The fairest of ten thousand of the fair,"

are to be understood in prosy literalness? To me this is not only absurd, but tasteless and even vicious. Had we the unvarnished, unedited, untransformed chronicle of his life, it could, it seems to me, not fail again and again in its pages to contain material which to us at our remove would seem out of place or at least such that we would not care to have them intrude too prominently onto the canvas. Nor am I in the slightest degree disillusioned or inclined to give one whit less respect and devotion to the one to whom I feel the term "Lord and Master" altogether fitting and proper.

For together with them must have been present other qualities and aspects of a nature and magnitude to keep the perspective aright. And despite the blindness of eye and deafness of ear which he encountered and which led many to ignore or be repelled by what proved to be the weightier qualities, these latter were not obscure to all. Instead they were detected and properly, if not completely, approved.

And I am convinced that could we see them today, we should appraise them more justly than did those who heard and were repelled, precisely as our appraisal of the paintings of Rembrandt is more just than was that of his contemporaries. There are few more potent correctives for myopia than the quiet lapse of the years. Thus as an historian I am not afraid of what might happen were we in a position to open, Pandora-like, this casket of the past.

Accordingly I feel no trepidation in attempting to push back the years and to discover, by the most resolute probing and cutting away of material and in many cases lovely wrappings, the Jesus of history. To some it may seem as if this were inconsistent with what I have just written about the legitimacy of the quite opposite process: the evolution and development of the Christ of faith. Frankly, I fail to see the contradiction. Both seem to me of value, and both can be had at the one and the same time.

Even though the student in the course of his work becomes convinced that much of what is easily called "accretion" is actually far from being an original part, and that if he would see the original figure this element must be ruthlessly removed, he should yet be aware of its true nature and of its profound value. And — and this is the part so easily lost sight of by well-meaning but incompetent critics of the student (critics of the critics, if you will) — the values of the layers of accumulation, if values they are, are not destroyed or impaired, popular opinion on that point to the contrary notwithstanding, even when so appraised and regarded. To view them as lifeless and valueless *fragmenta*, as is so frequently done, is very shortsighted and stupid. And this point appears to me of sufficient importance to warrant a further word.

Let me take what may seem to some an extreme case. It will probably be conceded without argument that the three chapters in Matthew which have through the years been commonly styled the "Sermon on the Mount" provide one of the lovely and imperishable values of life. Without them we should be desperately the poorer. Now in the mature and reverent judgment of many students whose opinion is of consequence and not lightly to be rejected, it is equally certain that the "Sermon" is not a unit in the sense that it was delivered by Jesus at a given time; that instead it is highly composite, a mosaic of many utterances produced at different times and under very different circumstances; that while some of the words may well reflect in varying degrees words actually spoken by him to hearers in Palestine, there are other words which with equal certainty must be assigned to subsequent voices. In a word, the sermon as we have it may well be one of the homiletic masterpieces of all time; it is nonetheless in its present form an example of the homiletical skill of "Matthew," not of Jesus. In this paper it would be useless to seek to argue this point by point. In the first place, lack of space forbids; more important than that, it would be completely pointless, for this demonstration has already been made and can be read by those who will take the trouble so to do. The point I am attempting to stress is that this does not in the slightest degree despoil the beauty or limit the value of the Sermon. We have it, and in the

conscience of most people who know it, it stands as an imperishable challenge and reward.

So far as I can see, the only possible retort is that its value is lessened or destroyed if uttered by any save Jesus himself. To such a retort no convincing answer can, of course, be given, for by so phrasing himself the man indicates, if his words are really the reflection of his conscious and considered thinking and not simply a thoughtless repetition of a mouth-filling sentiment, that he holds a view of revelation which, to adapt a phrase which today is all too common, is "altogether other." That is, only utterances by God himself or his Son are valid and valuable; they are true simply because God or Jesus says so. To one who holds such a restricted and mechanical view of revelation and, consequently, of inspiration of the Scriptures nothing can be said save that many of the loveliest flowers of life thereby must be ruthlessly and cavalierly uprooted and destroyed. Reduced to fairly low terms it would mean: "canonicity ensures historicity." Whatever is in the Bible is true and of blessed value, not because it has commended itself to the conscience and practice of mankind, but because it is included in a magical book. And I said "reduced to fairly low terms" instead of the more familiar "to lowest terms," for, by this way of reasoning, the mere fact that the Sermon on the Mount stands in the New Testament would not guarantee its value. If it be not the unedited utterance of Jesus himself, it would have to go: the fact that an evengelist penned it would be to all intents and purposes immaterial. To those holding that sort of view of inspiration little, it seems to me, can be said. But, I must repeat, to me such an attitude not only is incomprehensible and repellent; it destroys utterly values which can never be replaced. And even more sinister if possible, it leaves the student, whose patient and honest search has led him to conclusions which he must accept, for the evidence cannot be denied, in precisely the sorry state of Galileo, who either did whisper, or ought to have, "*Eppur si muove.*"

I have used the Sermon on the Mount as an example of values which to me remain untarnished, quite regardless of the findings of critical research as to their ultimate source or origin. One other example may be cited, the "Great Commission." It is prob-

ably no exaggeration to say that the majority of students whose study and experience make them competent to express an opinion, and whose opinions are the result of an honest appraisal of the evidence, with their hands, so to speak, held behind their backs as they watched the scales, would agree that the familiar words with which the Gospel of Matthew closes cannot be ascribed to Jesus himself. Again it is needless here to reprint the evidence which is available to all competent to read it — and which should seem prescribed reading for all who would venture an opinion. If their verdict be right, the back of foreign missions, in the eyes of many, is broken. An acquaintance told me soberly, even if with considerable heat, that if he believed that Jesus did not express himself precisely as Matthew 28: 18–20 asserts, he would at once lose all interest and abandon all support of the mission enterprise. To me that was a terrible indictment, not of critical research, for the evidence still stood despite the indignant word, but of the man himself. Again and again through the years his word has been to me, if ever I needed it, a warning of the peril oftentimes involved in the confession which seems so broad-gauged and catholic: "It doesn't make any difference what a man believes, so long as he is honest in it." Sometimes, unfortunately, it does.

To many of those who have sought to relive these early days the fact that the Great Commission does not seem to have been the sudden about-face of a Jesus who but a short time before had warned his disciples against precisely this undertaking, but the discovery of his subsequent followers, so aglow with confidence that they were entrusted with a message that all should hear, the most precious gift that the God of life had ever entrusted to men, that they became convinced that the hand at once of compulsion and blessing was upon them to make possible to all what had been bestowed upon them, gives the word an increased and compelling force. And with no sense of disillusion they can well understand how in the course of the years, once horizons had broadened and the mission was flourishing, the early church easily became convinced that since God was manifestly blessing its endeavor he must favor it, and if he favored it, he must always have so intended, for, they were sure, God did not change

his mind, but from the very beginning had planned and purposed all that was ever to come to pass. Then what more natural than the corollary? If God had so purposed and planned, then Jesus who had shared his counsels, must have known and willed it too, and at the solemn moment of his departure from them had left it to them as his last commandment.

The point I am trying to make is that the unthinking protest of folk aghast at what, as they style it, the critics have done, that they have torn the Bible to pieces and have thrown away most of its content, is utterly without foundation. The values are still there, and they remain values for those to whom the word, "God has yet more light to let break forth," has meaning.

Accordingly, as I see it, the "quest of the historical Jesus" need not be regarded with trepidation. Of course the man who starts on that quest will speedily discover that much, perhaps most, of what has come to be regarded as part of the traditional figure is not, strictly speaking, such but has grown and become attached and entwined through the years. And he will not have gone very far before he discovers that this process started in the earliest days, that long before the gospels were produced it had been going on. But he will also, as I have tried to point out, discover two other points: the one, that that part of the growth which is of value still remains of value quite regardless of its immediate origin, and that it is folly to try to wish to discard it even as it is folly to try to separate the waters of the Mississippi near its delta and reject all as "spurious and worthless" which did not start out of Little Elk Lake in northern Minnesota. But the other point which he will discover at some stage or other in his quest is of equal importance. It is that though he will never succeed in his search, will never find the "historical Jesus" in such a way as to be able to portray him to folk accustomed to conventional biographies, he will get glimpses, if his eye be keen and he wide-awake, which will convince him of the greatness of the one for whom he quests.

He may become increasingly uncertain as to the exact details, may even hesitate to single out any particular saying or incident of which he will be ready to say, "This is an original, unretouched bit," for by that time he will probably have become convinced

that from the very first his portrayers were artists, not photographers. Nonetheless, despite the label, "negative" and "destructive," which may well be his only accolade, he will likely be convinced that in the materials there is much that is in the truest sense "original," even though he may be unable with preciseness to reproduce or isolate it. At times he may even think a bit whimsically of the old story of the captain and his silver teapot. Had he lost the teapot? Indeed no! He knew just where it was. It was at the bottom of the ocean. And he may be inclined to agree that he is in a somewhat similar fix.

But this mood will pass. He will realize that while it is perfectly true that it is impossible to be certain of enough facts, as has occasionally been said, to write a respectable obituary notice, if the notice is to be in any sense exactly dated, even chronological, there are nonetheless many sources of information available if he can see the forest for the trees.

He will be unwilling to say of this saying or that, regardless of how primitive it sounds, that it deserves to be put in quotation marks as an exact word preserved unchanged, for he will realize that during the years between the ministry and the writing of the gospels, the materials had been preserved not to pass on to posterity — there would be no posterity; the Lord would return at any moment — but as words to use in mission preaching to the unconverted, to buttress this or to point that. And he will realize that during the years of such use many an "And he said this . . ." or "And he did that . . ." must have been inevitably, even if, unconsciously, altered as it was translated not only from Aramaic to Greek but from the thinking of little Palestine to that of the far wider outside world.

But of one point he will become increasingly certain — at least he will if his quest has been at all like mine — that this figure who so eludes his later grasp did not so appear to those among whom he moved. However much he may become convinced that at that time in the history of the world there had become piled a huge heap of readily combustible materials of a nature to take speedy flame — he may discern in the heap, among other things, Jewish Messianism, increasing unrest and passionate longing for security and assurance in the Mediterranean world on the part of

men from under whose feet familiar pavements and accustomed landmarks had suddenly dropped — but he will likely see that such piles rarely take flame of themselves; and he will ask, "Who lit this match?" From then on his quest will become more certain. One thing will stand out in increasing brightness — the direct influence upon his followers of this one who seems to have started the conflagration. And at times he may wish that he knew a better word than the not too happy *personality*, for he will be increasingly convinced that herein lies the real end of his quest.

This figure may seem vague and indistinct to him and to his modern fellow questers, but he will be increasingly sure that it did not so appear to those who heard him by the lake or in the synagogue or temple; for he will ponder that folk are rarely impressed, at least for long, by those whom they do not understand. And it will become increasingly clear that at one point the perfectly natural offering of gold and frankincense and myrrh has done him, the later searcher, a distinct disservice, namely, in its attempt to invest the one of whom he is in search with omniscience; in a word, in its careful attempt to free him from the expression of views which the subsequent verdict of history might seem to reverse or prove mistaken.

The significance of this will become to him increasingly real. He will see that the cardinal mistake of those who have started on this quest is their acceptance of the point of view, hinted at in the gospels, especially by Mark, and which has since become traditional, that Jesus' hearers, including his disciples, failed to understand his meaning, even in matters of the intensest concern to him. He will recognize, as all before him have, that the main incentive to early Christian preaching was the conviction that the end of the age was at hand; that at any moment, but surely in their own lifetime, they were convinced that the literally world-shaking climax would come. He will further see that this is a genuinely early stratum; that not only in the early chapters of Acts, about which possible historical doubts could be raised, but in the letters of Paul this confidence is central. It was the mainspring which made the early machinery go. And subsequently, as the end of the first century dawned and the event did not occur as anticipated, it came, always reluctantly, less and less to the

fore. Rarely given up, it continued a confidence; but bitter experience, which might well have spelled disaster, had taught that the "in this generation" had been cruelly wrong.

Once he has really grasped the significance of this, his ears will be deaf to many modern siren-like voices (especially to those who intone the beauties of the so-called "liberal Jesus"), for he will ask himself: Is it conceivable after the first generation had passed away without the expected coming that followers of Jesus could have put such a word in his mouth when it could now manifestly never be realized? He will thus be convinced that his first thought was right. This *was* the initial conviction of the first disciples; blazing fervidly at the very start of their mission.

He will then ask himself another question: What started that belief in their minds? Is it not likely that it was the view of Jesus himself, which he had constantly expressed and which they had understood full well? What other explanation of its universal and central importance in their earliest preaching is comparable in likelihood with this? Had his word been something different, is it likely that he would have made the impress which he obviously did upon them, and yet at the same time that they should from the very first have substituted a different gospel?

Thus he will become increasingly convinced that this quality of obtuseness to his message, which the evangelist Mark ascribes to the disciples, is in no sense historical, but the creation of the evangelist himself hard put to it to explain why his disciples had failed so tragically to understand who he was and what he was announcing; why despite his crystal-clear, thrice-given prophecy of his death and resurrection "after three days," they could have been caught so completely aback when the predicted event transpired that they had fled back north without awaiting the consequence of the portentous third day. Were they so little impressed by him as to disbelieve his word? Were they so obtuse as to fail to understand what is so clearly phrased as to be unmistakable to the present-day reader? Was Jesus so unable to express himself with clarity on matters to him vital? The more he ponders these insistent questions, the more convinced he is likely to become that all of this picture of a figure speaking words of clarity — so that the common people heard him gladly — but yet somehow

veiling them so that none might understand, is a perversion of facts, innocent and natural it may well be, but nonetheless a perversion of facts and the source of constant misunderstanding through the years. He will see, and not forget, that this all too common assumption is fraught with a twofold hazard. Either Jesus was strangely unable to make himself understood or his own disciples were so amazingly obtuse and unreceptive as to make it utterly improbable that any of the words which they passed on had been understood aright. And both horns of that dilemma will seem to him about equally sharp.

Instead, if he is wise, he will take as his guide and compass the hypothesis that Jesus was not misunderstood by his hearers — friends or foes alike. Rather they heard and understood all too well. As the years went by and new developments took place, as it became increasingly clear that their expectation was not to be realized, how natural it was to seek to explain the awkward fact: It was not that Jesus had been mistaken; that was impossible. Was he not, even then, at God's right hand, his rightful place for all eternity? Not he, but his followers had been at fault. As new developments arose — a clear-cut view of the significance of his death and resurrection and ascension to glory; his almost dizzy ascent to Godhood; the gentile mission; the significance and necessity of baptism and the sacred meal — there arose with them the confidence that these, all of them, had been but part of the unfolding and purposed plan of God, anticipated and predicted in Scripture, known and commanded by the one who shared the heart and counsel of God.

There are few keys which will fit all locks and open all doors. One of the most constant dangers to the historian is failure to recognize that patent fact. He is ever likely to feel that his is the universal passkey; and if a door fails to open to that key to conclude that the lock is jammed and to supplement the key with a jimmy. Many an important contribution from the ablest scholars, from Strauss and Baur to Torrey, has suffered and been disregarded just because of that overemphasis and undue use of what in itself was sound and valuable. I would not prove blind or deaf to my own warning.

Much will always continue to remain doubtful and unknown.

We shall never see him as he was. Nonetheless, once freed from this twofold initial error — first, that while we could have understood him, those about him, including even his intimates, could not, either through their own stupidity or because he spoke with deliberation in such a wise as to perplex and mislead; second that his understanding heart and head anticipated and foreknew all that was ever to transpire — we are in a position once again to examine the early documents, with a rather better chance of discovering in them clues long hidden from our own blind eyes which will materially aid us in our search, for we will be content to let him who lived in the first century in little Palestine speak and act as such. We shall not expect to find his words addressed to us, over their heads. We shall not attempt to use as the measuring stick of authenticity the query, "Were they fulfilled as spoken?" Instead we shall rid ourselves once and for all of the notion that he was talking to us, for we shall realize that that has been the crowning folly of every age — the notion that *it* was the final climax and culmination toward which all the purposes of God had labored. We shall realize that he was not concerned with ages yet unborn; that it was to those of his own age and race that he spoke, convinced that it was to them that he had been sent in the mercy and providence of God. And to them he sounded a note, proclaimed an imperious word as a herald from the Most High, with a compelling fervor which none could mistake. In the hearts of many it led to fear lest the ancient landmarks be shaken and to hate lest the threatened ax descend. Others heard him gladly, believed his word, were convinced that finally God had hearkened to the cries of the poor and distressed which for so long had daily ascended to him, and would speedily intervene to right their cruel wrongs. Those fires did not go out. Instead the death of the one who had sounded that life-giving note but the more convinced them; in sober truth it seemed easier to disbelieve in the power of death itself than to believe that he could have been mistaken. And in this confidence they continued, as had he, to proclaim the word of God which they had heard from his lips.

That this confidence was theirs seems impossible to deny. The records of those early days seem at this point unmistakable

Why it was so, why to so very few through the millennia known to us has been given the power to arouse and convince, in seeming contrast to all the sober and assured facts of life — that is a far different question, and one which still eludes our search. Were we to discover the answer to that query, we might with more discernment answer the Psalmist's awe-struck cry, "What is man that thou art mindful of him?" — and in the answer find something still more worthy of awe.

THE DIVI OF THE HADRIANIC PERIOD

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Information about the cult of the *divi* and *divae* greatly increased with the publication of the Feriale Duranum.[1] The editors of the latter have shown that the *divi* and *divae* whose cult the Army took over were those of the *fasti publici*. The *divae* included Trajan's sister Marciana and her daughter Matidia but no member of the Julio-Claudian and Flavian families. The Feriale Duranum permits a reconstruction of the list of the sixteen *divi* of 183 A.D.[2] and of the twenty *divi* of 224 A.D.[3] as follows:

The twenty *divi* of 224 A.D.	The sixteen *divi* of 183 A.D.
Augustus	Augustus
Claudius	Claudius
Vespasian	Vespasian
Titus	Titus
Nerva	Nerva
Trajan	Trajan
Marciana (†112 A.D.)	Marciana
Matidia (119 A.D.)	Matidia
Plotina[4] (121/2 A.D.)	Plotina
Sabina	Sabina
Hadrian	Hadrian
Faustina the Elder	Faustina the Elder
Antoninus Pius	Antoninus Pius
Lucius Verus	Lucius Verus
Faustina the Younger	Faustina the Younger
Marcus Aurelius	Marcus Aurelius
Commodus	
Pertinax	
Septimius Severus	
Caracalla	

[1] R. O. Fink, A. S. Hoey, and W. F. Snyder, "The Feriale Duranum," Yale Classical Studies vii, 1940, 1–222, especially 181–190. For the entry in column I, lines 11–12, I follow Hoey's restoration, p. 183, note 870.

[2] C.I.L. vi, 299, II, line 14.

[3] C.I.L. vi, 2107. Twenty *divi* are attested also for 218 A.D.

[4] Plotina's consecration is not yet attested. But it may certainly be inferred, as indeed the editors of the Feriale Duranum have inferred it. So also P. L. Strack,

It has been argued that Livia the wife of Augustus was on the list down to the time of Marcus Aurelius, because games were celebrated in her honor in Egypt in 147–8 A.D. and because her statue was set up with that of Augustus in the center when the temple of the *divus Augustus* was rebuilt in 159 A.D.[5] But these marks of honor do not prove inclusion of Livia among the *divi* of the *fasti publici.*

It is well known that Tiberius, who felt that Augustus should remain in a class by himself, had refused to allow the consecration of his mother, and that Livia did not become a consecrated *diva* until the reign of Claudius. Some reorganization of the imperial cult, as of everything else, had to take place under Vespasian. He restored the divine honors of Claudius, and adopting something like the attitude of Tiberius, he apparently placed the deified emperors on a higher level than the non-emperors, who might have special but lesser honors. Omission of Livia was quite natural for Vespasian, who did not have the motives of Claudius for her inclusion in the new list, but if Vespasian had preserved Livia as a consecrated *diva* of the *fasti publici*, it is not likely that anyone else would have ejected her from the list.

The case of Traianus *pater* has unusual interest. In the Panegyricus Pliny speaks of Trajan's wife and sister in the third person (83–84), but he addresses Nerva and Traianus *pater* with the second person (89). *Quanto nunc, dive Nerva, gaudio frueris, cum vides*, etc. *Sed et tu pater Traiane* (*nam tu quoque, si non sidera, proximam tamen sideribus obtines sedem*), *quantam percipis voluptatem*, etc. This means (1) that Traianus *pater* in the year 100 A.D. was dead like Nerva, (2) that he was a kind of second class *divus*, and that is how Durry[6] interprets it despite Strack's attempt to date the death of Traianus *pater* in 112 A.D., a year which the Fasti Ostienses have now eliminated. The African inscription I. L. S. 307 of 112 A.D. is so worded that it could honor a living man, but it could honor also a man already dead. The dedicator may have reserved the term *divus* for deified

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Untersuchungen zur römischen Reichsprägung des zweiten Jahrhunderts II (Stuttgart, 1933), 115–117.

[5] G. Grether, "Livia and the Roman Imperial Cult," A.J.P. lxvii, 1946, 222–252, especially 251–252.

[6] M. Durry, Pline le Jeune, Panégyrique de Trajan (Paris, 1938), pp. 233–234.

emperors. That evidence does not warrant rejection of the evidence from Pliny. It is clear from the coins that Traianus *pater* did become a *divus*, but this means merely that he was, so to speak, *divus cognominatus*, for it is impossible to believe that his name was removed from the list of consecrated *divi* in the *fasti publici* by Hadrian or anyone else. Neither Traianus *pater* nor Livia can ever have been on that list. Greatly respected as they were, they occupied a position lower than that of Augustus and the deified emperors. It would be out of character for Trajan to permit the unprecedented enrollment of his father or sister among the *divi* of the first class.

Hadrian's alleged adoption occurred when Trajan was dying, and there were those who suspected a fraud. Trajan's succession had been carefully prepared, and it occurred smoothly. Hadrian's unprepared succession, on the other hand, ran into trouble.[7] Hadrian, who could not afford to wait for a formal invitation to be emperor, anticipated the senate. Two important senatorial commands had to be entrusted to Q. Marcius Turbo, a knight; and four dissatisfied consulars had to be executed.

To acquire the necessary prestige Hadrian was forced to rely on more than the weak legitimation of a widely disbelieved story about an adoption. He more closely connected himself with Trajan by emphasizing another bond which ran through Marciana, Matidia and Sabina. Marciana and Matidia had no real importance for anyone but Hadrian. His wife Sabina was daughter of the latter and granddaughter of the former, and he appreciated the advantage which a member of the *domus imperatoria* had over every rival for the throne outside the imperial family. Marciana and Matidia received a place which Livia did not enjoy in the official religion of the Roman state; they received it not because they were more important than Livia but because of their great propaganda value to the new emperor Hadrian of dubious legitimacy. Marciana, a second-class *diva* in 112 A.D.,[8] must

[7] R. Syme, J.R.S. xxvi, 1946.

[8] The date is given by a reference under that year in the Fasti Ostienses = Inscriptiones Italiae, xiii (1), 5, xxii, lines 39–43; *IIII k. Septembr.* | [*Marciana Aug*]*usta excessit divaq*(*ue*) *cognominata.*| [*Eodem die Mati*]*dia Augusta cognominata. III*| [*non. Sept. Mar*]*ciana Augusta funere censorio*| [*elata est*]. The phrase *divaq*(*ue*) *cognominata* does not indicate a solemn *consecratio.*

have become a first-class *diva* early in the reign of Hadrian. In the absence of sons and nephews, the family tie with the beloved last emperor could be exploited to the full. Weak as it was, it constituted a more real tie than the connection with Augustus through his patroness Livia which Galba had thought it worth while to exploit.[9] In this kind of propaganda Galba and Hadrian behaved somewhat like Claudius in a similar situation. Claudius effected the consecration of his grandmother Livia and issued coins with her portrait to remind the world that even if his succession had been irregular, he was connected with the revered Augustus through her.

Whereas that of Marcus Aurelius is said to have been the only case where consecration occurred before the funeral [10] and whereas the consecration as *divus* or *diva*, it is clear, ordinarily took place at or after the funeral,[11] the Fasti Ostienses [12] reveal that the deceased Marciana was called *diva* in 112 before her funeral. On the other hand the two series of coins commemorating the *diva* Marciana have the legend *CONSECRATIO* like the coins commemorating the apotheosis of Matidia, Sabina, and Faustina. The Consecration coins commemorate the elevation of Marciana to a *diva* of the first class, at a special ceremony after a decree of the Senate, and this recently unprecedented honor for a person other than the emperor himself could not have occurred before her funeral, indeed, could not have occurred before the reign of Hadrian.[13]

[9] H. Mattingly and E. A. Sydenham, The Roman Imperial Coinage I, pp. 209 and 211. Plutarch, Galba 14, 5, whether or not he himself confused the empress Livia with Livia Ocellina, provides a striking illustration of the tie's practical value. In 119 A.D., therefore, Hadrian's *laudatio funebris* over his mother-in-law, which helped to focus attention on a precious tie, was not quite "the peak of gallantry," to borrow a phrase from D. R. Stuart, Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography, 210 (= Sather Classical Lectures iv, 1928).

[10] Vita Marci (ed. Hohl), 18, 3: *denique priusquam funus conderetur, ut plerique dicunt, quod numquam antea factum fuerat neque postea, senatus populusque non divisis locis sed in una sede propitium deum dixit.*

[11] Among the most important discussions of the procedure and ceremony of consecration are E. Bickermann's provocative article, "Die römische Kaiserapotheose," Archiv für Religionswissenschaft XXVII, 1929, 1–34, and the disagreement from F. Vittinghoff, Der Staatsfeind in der römischen Kaiserzeit. Untersuchung zur *damnatio memoriae*, Diss., Bonn, 1936, 74–90, 106–112.

[12] See note 8 above.

[13] Bickermann, op. cit., note 5 of pp. 9–10, suggested that one series of the Consecration coins was a Hadrianic emission. The proposal to separate the two series

The apotheosis of a non-emperor was a very serious step, and the innovation or rather the return to an occasional policy of the Julio-Claudian emperors, a policy which had been repudiated and of which apparently Vespasian had cancelled the last result, was motivated by serious considerations of state. This has not been fully realized, or it would not be the accepted opinion that Marciana was consecrated as early as the year 112 A.D. Before the death of Trajan an apotheosis of Marciana would revive the tradition of Caligula's preposterous consecration of Drusilla, which could never fail to provoke derision. The *optimus princeps* was not one to model himself on Caligula or to behave with Caligula's frivolity. In the year 112 A.D. there was no necessity for so radical a departure. The necessity did not arise until Hadrian and his supporters ran into the most serious peril. Until that time Marciana obtained as a *diva* of the second class merely a *proximam sidcribus sedem*. The apotheosis of Marciana expressed the emperor's veneration for Trajan as well as for the virtuous old lady herself. Hadrian could permit it and urge it; Trajan could not. And no ancient writer says he did.

Popular conceptions of the fate of great men after death, which of course prepare the way, are not to be confused with official recognition of a deceased hero as a god or as an associate of the gods, but there is nothing unofficial about a Roman denarius. Upon the death of Agrippa a coin was issued on which Augustus appeared holding a star over the head of Agrippa;[14] this does not represent "a sort of unofficial consecration of Agrippa" but an official recognition of Agrippa, not as a *divus* like the *divus* Iulius or like the *divus* which Augustus himself hoped to become someday, but yet as a kind of second-class *divus*, a spirit now residing close to the stars.

The case of Germanicus, whose celebration survived the revision of the religious calendar and of the imperial cult under Vespasian, illustrates the difference between a first class *divus* and a

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was rejected by P. L. Strack, Untersuchungen zur römischen Reichsprägung des zweiten Jahrhunderts I (Stuttgart, 1931), 201, footnote 870, but there is no real objection to a date under Hadrian for both series.

[14] H. Mattingly, Roman Coins (London, 1928), p. 149; L. R. Taylor, The Divinity of the Roman Emperor, pp. 196–197 (= Philological Monographs Published by the American Philological Association I, 1931).

second class *divus*. The pertinent entry in the Feriale Duranum II, 12–13, reads, *viii kal(endas) Iunias ob natalem G[er]mani[c]⟨i⟩ Cae[sa]ris sup[pli]cat[i]o [me]mori[ae Ge]rm[anici]| C[a]esaris*. Whereas the *supplicatio* in the case of a *divus* or *diva* of the first class was offered to the *divus* himself, in the case of Germanicus it was offered to his *memoria*, a word which recurs on the coins commemorating *divae* of the Julio-Claudian and Flavian families.[15] But in the case of Marciana and Matidia as in the case of Augustus, the *supplicatio* was made to the *diva* herself.

The inclusion of Marciana and Matidia in the list of those receiving *supplicationes* must have entailed as a matter of course the inclusion of Plotina, who had been a more important member of Trajan's family. From then on it was the custom of the dynasty to honor the deceased empress in this way. The eagerness of the Severi to pose as members of the same revered dynasty assured the continuation of their honors to the *divae* of the second century.

[15] H. Mattingly and E. A. Sydenham, The Roman Imperial Coinage, I, p. 118, for Agrippina the Elder; II, p. 134, for Domitilla.

IRENAEUS AND HELLENISTIC CULTURE

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Three recent discussions of Irenaeus by Reynders, Audet, and Enslin have examined the thought of Irenaeus almost exclusively in relation to the Christian tradition.[1] This attitude toward his writings is natural, since Irenaeus lives so largely within the tradition; but he lived in the philosophical-rhetorical world of his day as well as in the church. It is the purpose of this paper to examine some of the ideas which he shares with non-Christians of the second century. First we shall consider his use of doxographical materials for the opinions of philosophers, and then we shall turn to his knowledge of other authors and of rhetoric.

I

Early Christian writers commonly take their quotations of Greek philosophical opinions from handbooks. These books consist of lists of the views of philosophers and schools, summarized and arranged under subject-headings. The book commonly employed in the second century goes back to the reign of Augustus, when it was compiled by a certain Aetius and soon used by Philo of Alexandria. In the middle of the second century it was edited and ascribed to Plutarch; another form is that used by Stobaeus in the fifth century. Christian writers employ both forms. They are eager to arrive at the conclusion expressed by Philo in a fragment preserved by John of Damascus.[2]

All the different philosophies which have flourished in Greece and barbarian lands have not been able to reach the slightest certain conclusion in their investigation of physical problems. This may clearly be demonstrated by the differences, disputes, and dissensions of those of each sect

[1] D. B. Reynders, "La polémique de S. Irénée," Rech. de théol. anc. et méd. 7 (1935), 5–27; T. A. Audet, "Orientations théologiques chez S. Irénée," Traditio 1 (1943), 15–54; M. S. Enslin, "Irenaeus: Mostly Prolegomena," HTR 40 (1947), 137–65. R. Forni, Problemi della tradizione: Ireneo di Lione (Milan, 1939), is concerned exclusively with tradition.

[2] Joann. Damasc., Sacra parallela p. 749, Migne PG 96, 472.

who are seeking to establish their own views and overthrow those of their opponents.

Thus Philo uses doxographical information.[3]

Both Justin Martyr and Tatian use doxographical collections, but they do not seem to have known the work of Aetius in either Plutarchan or Stobaean form. Athenagoras, on the other hand, writing his Legatio in the year 177,[4] makes unmistakable use of Pseudo-Plutarch's doxography, and states that he uses doxographical literature.[5] In his sixth chapter, stock quotations from the Timaeus (28c, 41a) are followed by opinions of

Aristotle	Aetius i. 7. 16
Stoics	i. 7. 17

and when in chapter 23 he refers to the views of Thales and Plato on demons, the former opinions are taken, as he implies, from a doxography,[6] and he seems to quote from the Timaeus, epistles, and Phaedrus of Plato through a commentator like Albinus.[7]

Athenagoras' use of the doxography is not extensive, and we shall have to turn to his successors to find more thoroughgoing quotations from it. At Antioch about 180 it was used by Theophilus in his second and third books Ad Autolycum. Unfortunately the way he uses it reveals the slightness of his acquaintance with philosophy. The best example of his method is to be found in Ad Autolycum II 4.

(a) Some of the Stoa deny that there is any God at all, or if there is one they say that God thinks of no one but himself.	Aetius i. 7. 1: Some philosophers like Diagoras of Melos and Theodore of Cyrene and Euhemerus of Tegea say there are no gods at all.

[3] De providentia i. 22, De somniis i. 21ff.; H. Diels, Doxographi graeci (Berlin, 1879), 1f.; P. Wendland, "Eine doxographische Quelle Philos," Sitzungsberichte . . . Berlin 1897, 1074ff.

[4] G. Bardy, Athénagore (Paris, 1943), 10–16.

[5] Diels, op. cit., 4f.; cf. J. Geffcken, Zwei griechische Apologeten (Berlin-Leipzig, 1907), 175f. I do not agree with the view that a Jewish doxography underlies Athenagoras.

[6] Cf. Pseudo-Plutarch, i. 7. 11, 8. 2.

[7] Geffcken, op. cit., 212; cf. P. Wendland, Hippolytus Werke III (Leipzig, 1916), xxi, 19; R. E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Cambridge, 1937), 144.

(b) And the nonsense of Epicurus and Chrysippus set forth these views entirely.	(Theophilus' own idea)
(c) But others say that all things are self-moved, the world was uncreated and nature is eternal . . . no providence, but God is only everyone's conscience.	Hippol. Ref. i. 22. 3: Epicurus
(d) Others postulate a divine spirit immanent in everything.	Aetius i. 6. 1: Stoics
(e) Plato and those of his sect confess God as uncreated and father and maker of all.	Aetius i. 7. 31
(f) Then they suppose God and matter to be uncreated, and they call matter coeval with God.	Hippol. Ref. i. 19. 4

Theophilus' main source seems to be Aetius, but he does not follow him continuously, and he makes use of other doxographical writers.[8] Elsewhere (III 3) he points out that the philosophers disagree, as one can tell by examining their *dogmata*, on the gods, on the origin of the world, and on providence. These are titles taken from Aetius.

Theophilus' contemporary Irenaeus also made use of doxographical materials. Diels observed that in listing the opinions of philosophers (Adv. haer. ii. 14. 1–6, 287–97 Harvey) he followed Pseudo-Plutarch.[9] There is another passage which Diels does not seem to have observed in which Irenaeus is stressing the complete adequacy of scripture and the impiety of looking for solutions of problems not given there.[10] There are admittedly problems in scripture itself, but they are no greater than the insoluble difficulties in science (Adv. haer. ii. 28. 1–2, 349–51). These problems are almost entirely taken from the headings of Pseudo-Plutarch.

[8] Diels, op. cit., 59. Theophilus' mind is so confused on philosophical questions that his sources are difficult to identify.

[9] Diels, op. cit., 171f.

[10] On this cf. Audet, op. cit., 52.

(a) Cause of Nile's rise	iv. 1
(b) Birds' winter home	(derived from iv. 1, mention of winter)
(c) Cause of tides	iii. 17
(d) What lies beyond ocean	(derived from iii. 17, mention of ocean)
(e) Cause of rain, lightning, thunder, clouds, fogs, winds, etc.	iii. 3–4 and 7
(f) Cause of snow, hail, etc.	iii. 4
(g) Cause of phases of moon	ii. 29
(h) Cause of difference between salt and fresh water	iii. 16
(i) Differences between metals, stones, etc.	(derived from iii. 16, differences)

It is interesting to observe that Cicero (De natura deorum ii. 130–32) had mentioned the overflow of the Nile, the Etesian winds, the tides, and the existence of salt water far from the shore among his proofs for divine providence; elsewhere (Adv. haer. ii. 30. 3, 363) Irenaeus' own thought is close to his. But here Irenaeus concludes that "in all these matters we shall not be loquacious in searching for their causes; God alone who made them is truthful."

We may wonder what justification Irenaeus has for so easily dismissing these questions. Some of them had already been answered, but we must remember that answers which seem correct to us might easily have seemed absurd to an ancient writer. There was no clear criterion of truth in these matters, as Irenaeus insists.

(a) The first problem which Irenaeus chooses was notorious in antiquity for its difficulty. Thales, as the doxography notes, had attempted to solve it by the hypothesis that the Etesian winds kept the Nile from flowing to the sea; many later writers, including Philo (De vita Mosis i. 115), accepted his theory.[11] But Herodotus had pointed out the fact that other rivers were not affected by these winds (ii. 20). Anaxagoras, on the other hand, urged that it rose when the winter snow melted, but many writers rejected this view because they did not believe that snow falls in hot countries.[12] Herodotus himself argued that the winds brought rains which filled the Nile (ii. 24–25); his theory is open to the

[11] A. Wiedemann, Herodots zweites Buch (Leipzig, 1890), 102.
[12] Ibid., 104ff.

objection which he had already brought against Thales! Cf. J. O. Thomson, History of Ancient Geography (Cambridge, 1948) 272 f.

(b) Aristotle (Nat. anim. viii. 12, 596b20) had already known where storks and cranes went in the winter, but his information had been forgotten by such writers as Pliny (Hist. nat. x. 61). Aelian (Nat. anim. iii. 13) knows, however.

(c) The cause of the tides was difficult to determine. Aristotle had attributed them to special characteristics of the Spanish coast. While Posidonius visited Cadiz to make observations and correctly concluded that they were related to the phases of the moon, Pseudo-Plutarch does not mention him.[13]

(d) What if anything lies beyond the world-encircling ocean was a matter of conjecture. Clement of Rome, whom Irenaeus knew, had spoken of "the ocean which man cannot pass and the worlds beyond it" (xx. 7). Origen (De princ. ii. 3. 6, p. 121:14 K.) understands Clement to refer to the Antipodes, which were regarded as non-existent by Lactantius (Div. inst. iii. 24, CSEL XIX 1, 254ff.) and Augustine (Civ. dei xvi. 9, p. 201 Welldon), as well as by Plutarch (De fac. in orbe lun. 7, p. 924a).

(e, f) These subjects, *τὰ μετέωρα*, were discussed in detail by Aristotle, Posidonius, and Seneca; Lucretius devotes his sixth book to them, following the Epicurean Letter to Pythocles (Diog. Laert. x. 84ff.). As Bailey observes,[14] these were "phenomena . . . in which the workings of nature showed some apparent element of caprice." Lucretius gives concurrent explanations of them, but non-Epicureans might well think that such explanations were alternative.

(g) Most ancient philosophers were aware that the phases of the moon were due to the earth's shadow (Aetius, Plac. ii. 29. 6 = SVF II 676); unfortunately Pseudo-Plutarch lists the minority opinions of Anaximander, Berossus, Heraclitus, and "some" Pythagoreans. But Lucretius (v. 705–50) had already refused to come to a conclusion.[15]

[13] Strabo, Geog. iii. 5. 8, pp. 173–74; J. B. Mayor, M. Tullii Ciceronis De Natura Deorum Libri Tres II (Cambridge, 1880), 105.

[14] C. Bailey, Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex III (Oxford, 1947), 1551f.

[15] Bailey, op. cit., 1437ff.

(h) The saltiness of sea water was a problem. Lucretius (v. 269–72) describes how water is purified by the ground and returns through springs to the sea, but he does not explain its saltiness.[16] Irenaeus knows a rhetorical proverb, "He who wants to learn that sea water is salt doesn't need to drink up the whole sea"; this is discussed in the next section.

(i) On the genera of metals and stones we may refer to the work of Pseudo-Democritus, *περὶ συμπαθειῶν καὶ ἀντιπαθειῶν*, mentioned by Tatian (c. 17, p. 18:12 Schwartz); cf. J. Bidez-F. Cumont, Les mages hellénisés I (Paris, 1938), 198ff.; A. J. Festugière, La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste I (Paris, 1944), 224ff. Corpus Hermeticum xvi. 4 (ii. 233:12 Nock) explains how the three elements of fire, water and earth come from a single source; cf. Asclepius 3 (ii. 299:7) on the origin of species.[17] But we cannot be sure that Irenaeus knew anything about such matters. Is he thinking of "living" and "dead" stones (cf. J. E. Plumpe, Traditio 1 [1943], 8ff.)?

Irenaeus' attitude is much like that of the Stoa. Strabo tells us that the Stoics, with the exception of Posidonius (who, he says, imitated Aristotle), avoid inquiring into causes because of their obscurity (Geog. ii. 3. 8, p. 104).[18] But Irenaeus inclines toward scepticism. No one can count grains of sand or stones or waves or stars; [19] even if it were possible, the cause of the resulting number could not be explained (Adv. haer. ii. 26. 3, 346f.). With the sceptics he would say that there is no evident criterion of truth. [20] They too refrain from making "firm and positive assertions about any of the matters dogmatically treated in physical theory." [21]

[16] Ibid., 1359f.

[17] Geffcken (op. cit., 224) suggested that Athenagoras' reference to Hermes Trismegistus (c. 28) had in view something like Asclepius 37 (ii. 347:20).

[18] Compare the old Stoic view: Diog. Laert. vii. 123 = SVF III 642. Knowledge of such matters requires superhuman inspiration: Virgil, Georg. ii. 477–82, Aen. i. 742–46; Ovid, Metam. xv. 69–72; Wisdom vii. 17f. I owe these references to Professor A. D. Nock.

[19] Cf. H. V. Canter, "The Figure ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ in Greek and Latin Poetry," AJP 51 (1930), 37f. ("an impossible count or estimate"). The number of the stars or of grains of sand was a sceptical example (Sext. Emp., Adv. Dogm. ii. 147). Cf. also Ecclus. i. 2–3; it is a common expression in the Old Testament.

[20] Sext. Emp., Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 179.

[21] Ibid., i. 18.

In fact, his thought is eclectic, and his philosophical vocabulary is not that of any one school. He uses κατάληψις for "comprehension" (i. 2. 5, 21; i. 8. 1, 68) but rejects the Stoic λόγος ἐνδιάθετος (ii. 12. 4, 278). He uses ὑπόληψις for "opinion," as the Stoics and others use it (iii. 5. 1, 19), but he speaks of ἡ ἀληθὴς περὶ τῶν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν ὑπόληψις (v. 2. 3, 323). The sceptics also speak of the δογματικὴ ὑπόληψις of Stoics, "the acceptance of a fact which seems to be established by analogy or some form of demonstration" (Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 147). In the sceptical manner he criticizes Plato for introducing the cup of oblivion, "ostensionem nullam faciens, *dogmatice* autem respondens" (ii. 33. 2, 378). Yet in another place (ii. 32. 1, 372) he contrasts δόξα ἀνθρωπίνη with the δόγμα of Christ. And finally, as Audet observes,[22] he stresses experience almost in Aristotelian fashion! Irenaeus cannot be classified among philosophical schools. His interest, as we shall see, is more rhetorical than philosophical.

II

At the very beginning of Irenaeus' work against heresies is a passage which has been taken rather too literally by his interpreters. His disavowal of rhetorical skill is not unrhetorical, and it shows an awareness of a standard from which he is willing to deviate (i. praef., 6). Similarly his apology for living in Gaul among the Celts is the statement of one who is accustomed to better things. Rohde has pointed out that the second sophistic movement was militantly Hellenic,[23] and as a matter of fact Gaul was an area where sophists became rich.[24] Let us look at Irenaeus a little more closely.

The fact that he presents his biblical theology in terms of education [25] should encourage us to think that he regarded his own

[22] Audet, op. cit., 26f. Sometimes, as W. L. Knox observes (JTS 47 [1946], 181), he writes as an historian. He wrote a "very brief and most useful" book Πρὸς Ἕλληνας περὶ ἐπιστήμης (Eusebius, H. E. v. 26). Could Eusebius' notion possibly be due to too rapid glancing at Pseudo-Plutarch, bound among Irenaeus' books? Cf. H. J. Lawlor, Eusebiana (Oxford, 1912), 136ff., for Eusebius' use of titles.

[23] E. Rohde, Der griechische Roman (Leipzig, 1876), 297.

[24] Lucian, Bis accusatus 27.

[25] F. R. M. Hitchcock, Irenaeus of Lugdunum (Cambridge, 1914), 52ff. A. Dufourcq, S. Irénée (Paris, 1904), 64ff., claims that this idea is Aristotelian, but as F. Vernet, "Irénée (Saint)," Dict. de théol. cath. VII 2 (Paris, 1923), 2508, observes it is implied in the Bible itself.

education as not wholly a mistake; and so we are not surprised to find him pointing out to his opponents their lack of education and implying his own thorough training. They do not know music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, or any other theoretical arts; nor have they gone on to medicine, the study of herbs, or any other study related to health; nor do they know painting, sculpture, metal-working or marble-carving, et cetera; they are ignorant of these practical arts as well (ii. 32. 2, 373). They are unwilling to apply the effort, the thought, and the perseverance required. When he states that they cannot learn a tenth or even a thousandth part of these studies, he apparently has in mind both their own limitations and the vastness of the educational process. Perhaps he is also considering the fact that he himself does not know it all.[26]

What does Irenaeus know? Education naturally began with the alphabet, and Irenaeus has retained an interest in Jesus' early knowledge of the alphabet, while questioning the apocryphal story (i. 20. 1, 177f.);[27] he also knows that the alphabet was introduced to Greeks by Cadmus and Palamedes (i. 15. 4, 152f.).[28] Of course his attention was drawn back to these matters by Marcosian alphabetism. The boy would next go on to Homer, whom Dio Chrysostom (Or. xviii. 8, ii. 317:13 De Budé) calls "the beginning and middle and end" of rhetoric; Irenaeus frequently quotes Homer, refers to himself as one experienced in Homeric studies, and perhaps (as Ziegler suggested[29]) made up a cento of verses from various parts of Iliad and Odyssey (i. 9. 4, 86f.). Rhetoric paid considerable attention to Aesop's fables (Hermogenes, Progymn. 1, p. 3:5 Spengel), and Irenaeus uses the dog chasing his shadow for an illustration (ii. 11. 1, 275. Cf. Babrius, Fab. 79 [p. 77 Rutherford]). The rhetoricians usually begin their manuals with an analysis of mythology, and Irenaeus is able to refer to the Lernaean hydra (i. 30. 14, 241), the Pandora "of Hesiod" (ii. 14. 4, 296; cf. 21. 2, 325), and the giants (ii. 30. 1, 362). Dio Chrysostom recommends the study of Menander and Euripides (Or. xviii. 6, ii. 316:19 De Budé); Irenaeus refers to Menander

[26] Cf. F. H. Colson, "Philo on Education," JTS 18 (1916–17), 151ff.
[27] See my note in HTR 39 (1946), 72.
[28] The same story is found in Pliny, Hist. nat. vii. 192.
[29] H. Ziegler, Irenäus der Bischof von Lyon (Berlin, 1871), 17.

(ii. 18. 5, 315), paraphrases Antiphanes' Ἀφροδίτης γοναί, calling it "theogony" (ii. 14. 1, 287), alludes to the "tragic Oedipus" of Sophocles (v. 13. 2, 356), and mentions Pindar and Stesichorus (ii. 21. 2, 326; i. 23. 2, 192).

While he calls his opponents "sophists and grammarians" (iv. 1. 1, 146), he himself is not ignorant of literary problems. He is aware of textual difficulties (v. 30. 1, 406); he knows what allegorical interpretation is and tries to avoid it;[30] and he knows that the apostle Paul makes use of the rhetorical figures *hyperbaton* and *diastasis* (iii. 7. 1, 25).[31] In his anti-gnostic arguments, as Reynders observes,[32] he relies almost entirely on the *dilemma* and the *question*.

The most striking example of Irenaeus' rhetorical training is to be found in his use of examples. These examples or illustrations are scattered through his pages. There are not many of them, but they can be classified under several headings and clearly reveal their rhetorical origin. We shall not discuss them in detail but shall simply classify them, adding a few parallels.

(a) Art

i. 8. 1 (67f.), ii. 15. 3 (304; from Melito, Homily on the Passion 36–37), 19. 8 (320), 33. 4 (379)

These examples come from the sophistic ἐκφράσεις of pictures and statues like the Imagines of Philostratus: cf. E. Rohde, Der griechische Roman (Leipzig, 1876), 335 n. 3. The first one seems to be an expansion of Babrius, Fab. 95: 63f. (p. 92 Rutherford).

(b) Hunting

i. 31. 4 (243), ii. 14. 8 (301)

Philostratus, Imag. i. 28, describes a boar hunt, and items similar to these two examples may be found in Xenophon, Cyn. x. 7–8, xi. 2; Oppian (?), Cyn. iv. 77ff., 374ff.

(c) Natural Philosophy and Physical Theory

ii. 12. 2 (277), 12. 4 (278), 18. 5 (314), 19. 6 (319), 28. 4 (354), iv. 9. 2 (169), 39. 1 (298), v. 3. 3 (327), 27. 2 (399)

[30] P. Lestringant, Essai sur l'unité de la révélation biblique (Paris, 1942), 206f.

[31] Theon, Progymn. 4, p. 82:19 Spengel; Aristides, De arte rhet. i. 3, p. 464: 16. Irenaeus uses *diastema* (cf. ii. 25. 1, 343) for *diastasis*.

[32] Op. cit., 8.

These examples show Irenaeus to have been a pupil of those who "though they pursued philosophy, had the reputation of sophists." Philostratus (Vit. soph. 8, p. 492) expressly distinguishes Dio Chrysostom and Favorinus (W. Schmid, RE VI 2078–84) from real sophists.

(d) Music

ii. 25. 2 (343) — lyre

This comparison was very common; cf. P. Lejay, "Le plectre, la langue et l'esprit," Bulletin d'ancienne litt. et d'arch. chrét. 2 (1912), 43–45.

(e) Medicine

iii. 5. 2 (19), 25. 7 (137), iv. 38. 1 (292)

In discussing the use of Menander and Euripides, Dio Chrysostom (Or. xviii. 7, ii. 317:2 De Budé) uses a medical example. They are common.

(f, g, h) Kingship, Gymnastics, Metal-Working

i. 8. 1 (67f.), v. 13. 2 (356), v. 29. 1 (404)

I have omitted one example of military affairs (iii. 23. 2, 126), two of kingship (iv. 34. 1, 270; v. 24. 4, 390), and one of either gymnastics or military affairs (v. 22. 1, 385) from my list in the belief that they are largely artificial. The others give a picture of Irenaeus' rhetorical environment. One example listed under "natural philosophy" is especially striking. It is the proverb, "He who wants to learn that sea water is salt doesn't need to drink up the whole sea" (ii. 19. 8, 320). Athenagoras (Leg. 12, p. 129:29 Geffcken) says: "Those who appreciate honey and milk in small doses appreciate the whole if it is good." And similarly Philostratus (Vit. soph. 22, p. 522) quotes Dionysius of Miletus as saying that honey should be tasted with the finger-tip and not by the handful.[33] Evidently it is a proverb for rhetoricians, and Irenaeus' thought is closely related to it.

Is there any possibility of tracing Irenaeus' teachers? We know one writer familiar to Irenaeus who was interested in works of art, in philosophy, and in animals. Indeed this man has been suggested as the Syrian source of Oppian's Cynegetica.[34] This person is Tatian. Two points tell against such a theory of Irenaeus' source. In the first place, Irenaeus disliked Tatian in-

[33] Cf. Lucian, Quomodo hist. conscr. sit 4.

[34] M. Wellmann, Der Physiologos (Philologus, Suppl. 22, 1931), 9; cf. Wellmann, "Timotheos von Gaza," Hermes 62 (1927), 189ff.

tensely (i. 28. 1, 220; iii. 33. 7, 130). Still more important, Tatian's slight knowledge of art and his strenuous opposition to it make it impossible for him to have been the writer or speaker who sympathetically explained the artist's mind to Irenaeus. We do not know who his teacher was, just as we do not know who all his Christian teachers were. But we may be sure that in rhetoric as in Christianity he was an apt and intelligent pupil.

About twenty years ago, this judgment was made of Irenaeus.[35]

> À l'inverse de son maître Justin, Irénée n'est pas un philosophe. Il ne combat pas la sagesse profane; il se content de la dédaigner.

Too often we are content with a picture of Irenaeus as orthodox but rather stupid. The camera needs to be refocused and the picture taken over again. Irenaeus is certainly devoted to Christian tradition. But he represents the confluence of Hellenism and Christianity no less distinctly than the apologists do. And he is choosing from the maelstrom of Greek thought what he thinks will be adaptable to the Christian religion. He should not be neglected simply because his results survived.

[35] G. Bardy, Littérature grecque chrétienne (Paris, 1928), 36. In spite of Justin's admiration for philosophy, his education lacked such elementary studies as music, astronomy and geometry (Dial. 2, p. 8 Otto; cf. Plato, Protag. 318e, and the Hermetic Asclepius 13, p. 312:2 Nock, with n. 115, p. 369). His advancement in Platonism was insufficient to give him the correct answer to the question whether the soul remembers the vision of God (Dial. 4, p. 20; cf. Phaedrus 249c–d). On this error depends his Christian opponent's victory.

THE GOSPEL FRAGMENTS P. EGERTON 2.

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The fragments of an unknown Gospel published by Mr. Skeat and myself in 1935 have recently been made the subject of a thoroughgoing and very interesting study by a Japanese scholar, Dr. Goro Mayeda, to whose kindness I owe a copy of his work.[1]

Dr. Mayeda, who is now a Privatdozent at Geneva, was a pupil of Prof. Martin Dibelius at Heidelberg, but his monograph was a dissertation for the doctoral degree at Marburg. It is a model of its kind. Dr. Mayeda begins by reproducing the text of the papyrus, critically edited with the use of the various suggestions made by those who have studied it; then, after a brief *Einleitung*, in which he records the discovery and first publication of the fragments and discusses their date, he proceeds to a detailed investigation of the text, section by section, and finally, in his second chapter, examines the nature of the work and its place in early Christian literature. His conclusions are striking and novel enough to claim the attention of all who are interested either in this particular text or in the earlier literature of Christendom generally; and since his volume, from the time and the circumstances of its publication, may not be well known in America or Britain, I propose, with Prof. Nock's kind permission, to summarize them here.

I must, however, begin by some detailed remarks on and criticisms of Dr. Mayeda's first chapter, before I deal with the second, in which his general view is stated. It is necessary to emphasize that I, a mere papyrologist, am not an authority on the often very intricate questions of New Testament criticism which are involved; I can claim only such right to a judgment as belongs to an editor, who has of necessity studied the problems presented by the papyrus with some care. As may be seen from

[1] Das Leben-Jesu-Fragment Papyrus Egerton 2 und seine Stellung in der urchristlichen Literaturgeschichte, Bern, Paul Haupt, 1946, pp. 101.

the pamphlet, The New Gospel Fragments (British Museum, 1935), my original view was early modified in several respects, and I am far from thinking that I, or indeed anyone else, can pretend to have reached finality. I must emphasize one point in which Dr. Mayeda's treatment seems to me definitely superior to that of some other scholars. He recognizes fully the difference in the relation of the fragments (hereafter referred to as 'Eg.') respectively to St. John and to the Synoptic Gospels. To speak, as one or two writers have done, of Eg. as simply a sort of harmony of the Canonical Gospels, or as dependent on 'the four Gospels' generally, is in my opinion quite out of the question. The view of Dr. Wilfred Knox, that the author of Eg. was 'compiling a midrash on at least one of the Synoptic Gospels and the Fourth Gospel,' but that he knew the Fourth Gospel 'by heart, though somewhat inaccurately,' whereas his acquaintance with the other (whichever it was) was more superficial,[2] has much more probability, though I am not convinced, especially in view of Dr. Mayeda's work, that it is correct.

On the text of the fragments, as given by Dr. Mayeda on pp. 7–11, I have no comment to make except that in Fragment 2 verso (where on the whole the supplements adopted are reasonable enough, though not therefore certain) his text (that of Dibelius) in line 71 ignores the point after *ὕδωρ*. In our note [3] we suggested that this was either accidental or stichometrical. I do not now believe in the latter possibility, nor does it seem to me wholly legitimate, despite the difficulty of getting a reasonable construction, to resort to the hypothesis of an error if there is any alternative explanation. Cerfaux and Lagrange manage to retain the point: C. *καὶ τότε [εἰς τὸ] κατε[σταλμ]ένον ὕδωρ· ἐ[νῆκε]ν τὴν ῥᾴζαν αὐτῆς* (the sense here runs on, but there is enough of a pause to excuse a point), L. *καὶ τότε [ἐπι]κατέ[χεεν χεόμ]ενον ὕδωρ · ἐν[ῆκε]ν τὴν[γῆν ὁ σπόρος]*, Mayeda *καὶ τότε [ἡ γῆ τὸ] κατε[σπαρμ]ένον ὕδωρ ἐ[νέπιε]ν τὴν [σποράν λαβών]*. The variety of suggestions shows how hazardous it is to restore a passage so much mutilated. Scribes were, however, careless over

[2] Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity (London, British Academy, 1944) p. 90, footnote.

[3] Unknown Gospel, p. 24.

points, and the possibility of error and hence of a text which ignores the point here cannot be excluded.

I come now to Mayeda's *Einleitung*. His statement on p. 12 that 'füsr den Text des Neuen Testamentes selbst sind unter den Papyrusfunden der letzten Jahre die Chester-Beatty-Papyri besonders wichtig, *die aus dem III Jahrhundert stammen*,' though correct as intended, is so worded that it may mislead a hasty reader: it is, M. means, the N.T. papyri of the Beatty collection which date from the third century; the collection as a whole ranges from the mid-second to the fourth.

In chapter I Mayeda subjects the text to a detailed and indeed minute examination. His analysis shows great acuteness and a thorough knowledge of the field. There is perhaps at times a tendency to a fault very apt to beset doctoral theses, a somewhat mechanical — perhaps I might say 'pernickety' — handling of the evidence. Thus, on p. 16f., dealing with the first episode and referring to the view of J. Jeremias that the *νομικοί* and the *ἄρχοντες τοῦ λαοῦ* would hardly be addressed by Jesus 'nebeneinander,' he adds: 'Aber dieser Gedanke wäre nicht notwendig, wenn man damit rechnet, dass hier zwei Quellen vorhanden waren, von denen jede eine dieser beiden Bezeichnungen hatte, die der Verfasser unseres Papyrus dann übernommen hätte.' Is not this 'to consider too curiously'? I cannot see why the motley crowd of an oriental city should not have contained (or at least should not have been conceived by the author of this narrative as containing) various elements. The mention of both lawyers and rulers of the people in a single passage is an insecure basis for a distinction of different sources. But in the main M.'s discussion is both relevant and discriminating.

M.'s treatment of the crux offered by the Johannine passage, *ἐραυνᾶτε τὰς γραφάς · ἐν αἷς ὑμεῖς δοκεῖτε ζωὴν ἔχειν* (space) *ἐκεῖναί εἰσιν αἱ μαρτυροῦσαι περὶ ἐμοῦ* (see my article, 'Search the Scriptures' in Zeitschr. f. d. Neutest. Wis. xxxvii, 1939, 10–13) is especially interesting. One question is, I may recall, whether *ἐραυνᾶτε* in St. John is indicative ('ye search') or imperative ('search'). The papyrus text clearly supports the second. Further, are we then to render 'these (scriptures) in which ye think that ye have life, these are they which testify of me' or '(search

the scriptures) in which ye think ye have life; they it is which,' etc.? As I pointed out in the article referred to, the punctuation, with the definite space after ἔχειν, suggests that the latter sense was what the scribe had in mind, and it is a construction found in some ancient versions (M. gives a list of these). In *a*, *b*, syr^{cu} two alternative readings are found side by side, e.g. in *a*, "scrutate scripturas in quibus vos existimatis in illis vitam aeternam habere illae sunt quae testimonium dicunt de me in quibus putatis vos vitam habere hae sunt quae de me testificantur." In our commentary we suggested that the 'doublet' might be explained by supposing either that both readings were current in different manuscripts of John, that a commentator added the second in the margin, and that a later scribe incorporated the variant into the text without deleting the other version, or that the commentator quoted the words from the Gospel partially preserved in Eg. as a parallel, with the same result. M., however, suggests (p. 21) that this may be a case in which Eg. gives the original form of a saying which John has adapted to his special purpose: "der Imperativ mit ἐν αἷς ist vulgärer — der Satz καὶ οὐ θέλετε κτλ aber passt nicht dazu. Der Indicativ mit ὅτι ist johanneischer — und der Satz καὶ οὐ θέλετε gibt dann erst die Lösung. Es ist gut gemeinchristlich, zu sagen: 'sucht in der Schrift in der ihr . . . dann findet ihr mich.' Es ist echt johanneisch, zu sagen: 'ihr seid zum Täufer gelaufen, ihr durchsucht die Schrift, weil ihr . . . es ist alles recht, ich wäre auch dort zu finden, aber ihr wollt ja nicht!' " A careful reading of the Johannine context does certainly make it at least arguable that John was fitting into his discourse a saying which he had before him and which he altered slightly to suit his purpose, rather than that the author of Eg. took this isolated saying out of a text of John and changed it without any particular relevance. The point is of some importance, for as we shall see it has a bearing on one of the most interesting of M.'s suggestions. Whether M. is right in denying (p. 22) that μαρτυρεῖν, despite its frequent occurrences in John, is a specifically Johannine word and in saying that its use here differs from that in the other Johannine passages, is a question which I do not feel myself competent to answer.

M. further argues, rightly as it seems, that this whole passage

(lls. 1–20), despite its resemblance in substance to John, tends stylistically to resemble rather the Synoptics (p. 27). It is in fact one of the chief problems raised by the fragments, that, on the one hand, Synoptic incidents are related with marked material differences from the Synoptists, and, on the other, Johannine sayings appear in a setting which verbally accords better with the Synoptic style.

M. has a very interesting discussion (pp. 46–7) of the word ἐμβριμησάμενος, which occurs in l. 51. It is a word which has been much discussed and the various uses of which are not at first sight easy to reconcile with one another. In Mark xiv.5 'they scolded her' is an obvious rendering; Vulg. *fremebant in eam*. In John xi.33,38 it seems to express perturbation of spirit combined with anger at the slowness of the Jews and even of professed disciples to believe in the supernatural power of Jesus; Vulg. *infremuit spiritu, fremens in semetipso*. The real crux is in Mark i.43, a passage parallel to Matthew viii.1–4, Luke v.12–14. In the latter two this incident of the healing of the leper is related quite factually, with no indication of any special feeling in Jesus, but in Mark Jesus *pities* the leper (v.41 σπλαγχνισθείς, but D a ff r* E f ὀργισθείς, which Lake preferred, taking the anger to be against the leper, while Bevan, who also supported it, supposed that Jesus was angry with the evil power which caused the leprosy); and after healing the leper ἐμβριμησάμενος αὐτῷ εὐθὺς ἐξέβαλεν αὐτόν (Vulg. *comminatus est ei, statimque eiecit illum*). M., comparing Matthew ix.30, the healing of the two blind men, καὶ ἐνεβριμήθη αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς λέγων · ὁρᾶτε, μηδεὶς γινωσκέτω (Vulg. *et comminatus est illis Jesus dicens: Videte ne quis sciat*) says: 'Jesus hat den Geheilten streng zum Schweigen *ermahnt*, was auch Mk 1.43 gilt.' So too Dibelius: 'er bedroht ihn und treibt ihn fort.' M. supports this interpretation by a striking linguistic parallel from Japanese: the word *imasimeru* means both 'warn' and 'scold,' and *okoru* both 'be angry' and 'scold.' Similarly ἐμβριμᾶσθαι, he thinks, originally 'ein onomatopoetisches Verbum für "schnauben",' came to mean 'im bildlichen Sinn gleich zürnen, schelten und warnen.' He seems very likely to be right in this interpretation. We have, however, to account for the *var. lect.* ὀργισθείς in v.41. On the principle of the *lectio difficilior*

this might seem, apart from other considerations, the preferable reading. The explanation may well be, as suggested by Bonner (Harv. Theol. Rev. xx. 171 ff.) that *ὀργισθείς* is a retranslation of *iratus*, which itself was a translation of an original *ἐμβριμησάμενος*. M. mentions Bonner's view only to reject it, but it is certainly plausible; or one might explain *ὀργισθείς* as a gloss on *ἐμβριμησάμενος* which has taken the place of the latter.

One further observation on the text itself before I come to M.'s general view of its nature. On p. 51, commenting on lls. 60–62, he says: "Hier haben wir wahrscheinlich die Fortsetzung einer Geschichte, deren Anfang nicht mehr erhalten ist. Vermutlich stand in diesem verlorengegangenen Teil die befremdliche Frage *τὸ ξένον ἐπερώτημα*, von der wir in Z. 64 lesen." If by a *Geschichte* M. means an incident related by the author of Eg. (as against a parable told by Jesus), this seems to me very improbable. All the other verbs in the narrative itself are in past tenses, aorist or imperfect or pluperfect; here they are in the present and perfect. Surely it is more reasonable to suppose that these lines were spoken by Jesus. Perhaps they are actually part of *τὸ ξένον ἐπερώτημα*.

I must now turn to M.'s discussion of the nature of Eg., and first of all to what he says of its relation to the fourth Gospel. As I have already said, he emphasizes, unlike some other writers, the striking difference between this relationship and that to the Synoptists. In his general view he follows a line of thought suggested by Dibelius (quoted on pp. 23–4), who, à propos the Johannine parallels in lls. 1–29, holds that these passages make a 'vorjohanneischen Eindruck' and thinks it quite permissible to infer that, so far from Eg. being derived from John, the latter was using, in his individual way, materials on which Eg. was drawing quite independently. In the course of his discussion of the text M. several times points out passages where John might be taken not as the source of Eg. but rather as posterior, if not to Eg. itself, at least to the source which Eg. was using. I have already (above, pp. 55–56) referred to one such passage. M. further points out (p. 22) that whereas Eg. has in l. 9 *ζωὴν* alone, John (v. 39) has *ζωὴν αἰώνιον*; and he thinks it unlikely that an author basing his work on John would deliberately omit a word

so important to Johannine thought as *αἰώνιον*. This seems to me a very relevant observation, though we must no doubt reckon with the possibility that the author of Eg. was quoting, not very precisely, from memory. M. further considers that in Eg. the 'Gedankengang' is 'viel glatter' and makes the impression of an earlier tradition than John v. 36–47, in which vv. 41–4 seem to him a Johannine interpolation, which interrupts the sequence of the thought, into matter which John had derived from his authority. Here again, some plausibility must be conceded; at all events one may agree that the thought in Eg. is crisper and less diffuse than in John.

To illustrate the possibility that John was using sources now lost but still accessible to early Christian writers, M. studies (pp. 38–42) the episode of Nicodemus, John iii.1–21. As he very appositely remarks, the words attributed to Jesus are in large part much more like a general discourse than a specific answer to Nicodemus' questions: 'trotz des konkreten Beginns mit der Beschreibung der Person des Nikodemus und der Zeitangabe, dass es Nacht sei, endet der Abschnitt mit einer Rede Jesu und völlig situationslos.' Now Justin (Apol. i.61. 4f.) quotes the passage in a form very different from John: John *ἐὰν μή τις γεννηθῇ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος, οὐ δύναται εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ*, Justin *ἂν μὴ ἀναγεννηθῆτε, οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθητε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν*. This difference may be due, as M. admits, to an inaccurate quotation from a memory influenced by the Synoptists; but it is striking that Ps.-Clem. Hom. xi.26 quotes the words in exactly the same form as Justin except that between *ἀναγεννηθῆτε* and *οὐ μὴ* are interpolated the words *ὕδατι ζῶντι, εἰς ὄνομα πατρὸς υἱοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος*, which look like a later addition. Similarly Clemens Alex., Protrept. ix. 82, writes *ἦν γὰρ μὴ αὖθις ὡς τὰ παιδία γενήσεσθε καὶ ἀναγεννηθῆτε, ὥς φησιν ἡ γραφή, οὐδ' οὐ μὴ εἰσελεύσεσθε ποτε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν*.[4] I do not feel that this argument is conclusive, since Clem. and Ps.-Clem. may have been quoting from Justin and he, as already said, quoting from memory, but there is at least some ground for the hypothesis that Justin was using a source which John adapted to his own

[4] There is here a slip in M.'s text: he refers to Ps.-Justin, Cohortatio ad gentiles, ix.82. In answer to my query he has kindly given me the correct reference.

manner; one might indeed ask why Clem. and Ps.-Clem. should have gone to Justin rather than to John.

M. further quotes a passage of Irenaeus (v. 36,2) on the 'many mansions,' which he interprets concretely, in an eschatological sense, whereas John obviously interprets the mansions spiritually, and suggests that both writers may have been using a common source, each in his own way; and finally, quoting Justin, Dial. 88.7 *πρὸς οὓς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐβόα · οὐκ εἰμὶ ὁ Χριστός, ἀλλὰ φωνὴ βοῶντος · ἥξει γὰρ ὁ ἰσχυρότερός μου, οὗ οὐκ εἰμὶ ἱκανὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα βαστάσαι*, as against the longer version in John, regards the latter as an expansion of an original source more closely followed by Justin. I confess I am not much impressed by either of these arguments. In the second case in particular Justin might reasonably condense the passage [5] and in his second sentence follow, e.g., Matthew iii.11.

Discussing the relation of Eg. first to the Synoptists, then to John, M. asserts, justly in my view, that it is really not possible to regard Eg. as a mere 'mosaic' of Gospel excerpts. The author may have known some or all of the Gospels, and it is 'nicht ausgeschlossen, dass der Verfasser die Quellen nach dem Gedächtnis wiedergegeben hat' (p. 68), but it is more likely that he was freely using and adapting a body of tradition, written and unwritten. It is quite clear that the surviving four Gospels do not represent the whole of this tradition, even the written authorities (*πολλοὶ ἐπεχείρησαν ἀνατάξασθαι διήγησιν* Luke i.1; *πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα σημεῖα . . . . . ἃ οὐκ ἔστιν γεγραμμένα ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τούτῳ* John xx.30; cf. Acts xx.35). The Synoptists, says Mayeda, were primarily compilers rather than authors; the author of Eg. was consciously an author, using his materials freely and presumably drawing on various sources. The verbal resemblances to Luke pointed out by Mr. Skeat and myself, as well as by others, are to be accounted for rather by the fact that Luke was more of a conscious literary composition than Mark and Matthew, and that Eg. also was addressed in a similar spirit to a Hellenistic public, than by any direct use of Luke.

John also was 'viel weniger Sammler und mehr Schriftsteller

[5] But M. holds (p. 73) that 'Justin nirgends ein Kenntnis des Johannes-Evangeliums verrät.'

als die Synoptiker.' He was freely using various materials, in part Synoptic traditions (vi.1–21, xii.1–8, ii.13–16) to work out, in his own way, a theological conception which he felt it important to emphasize, and it may well be that the Gospel was written for 'einen sozusagen johanneischen Kreis' (p. 75): cf. the use of the second person in xx.31: *ταῦτα δὲ γέγραπται ἵνα πιστεύητε ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ ἵνα πιστεύοντες ζωὴν ἔχητε ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ*. All this seems indisputably true. M. then argues that the relationship between John and Eg. is by no means what might be expected if the latter were based on the former in the 'Johannine' passages. He gives a list of eight passages which show significant differences from John, such as the omission of *αἰώνιον* after *ζωήν* (see above, pp. 58–59), the imperative instead of the indicative in the same passage, the absence of eschatology in lls. 10–14, 18f., as compared with John v.45–7, xii.31, the use of *ἀποκριθεὶς ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν* instead of the Johannine *ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν*, etc. The probative value of one or other, indeed of each, of these points may be questioned without seriously affecting M.'s main point: is it likely that a writer writing under the influence of a Gospel like John, to which he must obviously have stood in closer relation than to the Synoptists, would so systematically get rid of the peculiar Johannine coloring and the special direction of John's thought? Is it not more likely, given the new significance and the individual turn which John clearly gave to traditions which he shared with the Synoptists or derived from elsewhere, that John and Eg. were alike drawing on a common source, each using it in his own way? M. does not suggest that Eg. is itself one of the 'many' works referred to by Luke, but rather that it derived some of its material from such a work. If he is right, we have in Eg., not indeed an earlier work than even the latest of the Gospels, but at least an echo of an early authority.

But what then is the character of Eg.? M. argues at some length (pp. 63–5) against the view expressed by Mr. Skeat and myself that it is, in fact, indubitably a real Gospel. He has here misinterpreted a perhaps careless use of a term to which we did not intend to attach any technical significance. By 'Gospel' we did not mean 'eine Schrift, die zur Verkündigung und Verbreitung der Botschaft dient,' but merely a real narrative of the life and

teaching of Jesus as against either a collection of sayings or a mosaic of Gospel excerpts.

That, however, is a minor matter. We must of course be very careful when so little of what was no doubt a work of some length remains, not to base on these fragments conclusions of too ambitious a scope, but there need be no difficulty in accepting the general relevance of M.'s contrast between John and Eg. John wrote, he suggests, for a Johannine circle of disciples, emphasizing and expounding certain theological views. Eg. is of quite different character. It is a straightforward and matter-of-fact account of the words and acts of Jesus, in which any deeper theological significance is avoided, in which indeed the story rather than the more recondite 'message' to be derived from it is the important thing. 'In den kanonischen Evangelien herrschen im grossen und ganzen die unmittelbar von Jesus stammenden Worte und Geschichten vor. Die meisten Apokryphen Evangelien aber bringen fabelhafte und phantastische Anekdoten von Jesus und seinen Jüngern zum Teil ketzerischen Charakters. Unser Papyrus gehört zu keinem dieser beiden Extreme.' (p. 77) It was in fact written by a writer who shows his ignorance of Palestinian affairs, for a Hellenistic Christian public: 'er gehört nämlich zu den Schriften, die nicht offiziell und kultisch von der Gemeinde, sondern privat und häuslich gebraucht wurden.'

M. proceeds to show that in all probability there was a reading public and perhaps not mere private but even small community libraries among early Christians. This may indeed be accepted without question; it was not long before the fishermen and peasants who were the first to accept Christ's teaching were joined by men and women of education and social standing. The Gospels themselves are evidence that there was a reading public; St. Luke, as already said, speaks of 'many' people who had written of the life and teaching of Jesus, and his Gospel and Acts were addressed to Theophilus, who was a κράτιστος. Papyrus discoveries in Egypt, though they concern mainly a time later than the middle of the second century, show clearly enough that Christians read and owned books of a religious kind and not confined to the Biblical scriptures. Texts written on the back of rolls already used for documents or for previous literary works

are not likely to have been intended for the use of a community or for liturgical purposes; they must rather have been for private use. And if this is true of a later period it is surely reasonable to suppose that even in quite early times there were Christians able and eager to read works of edification and narratives of the life of Jesus.

This, then, is M.'s final conclusion: Eg. is an example of a *genre*, of which other specimens may perhaps turn up hereafter, not represented in existing remains, part of the popular literature of the early Church. It is not a 'canonical' Gospel; it stands outside the Canon and was written 'wesentlich novellistischer als die Evangelien.' But it dates from before the formation of the Canon, the establishment of which made such works unnecessary; it depends on sources in part independent of the Gospels and perhaps as old as they, but, regarded from the point of view of the critical historian, it adds 'keine neuen Materialien für die Geschichte des Urchristentums, und man lernt keine neuen Ereignisse des Lebens Jesu kennen.'

M.'s theory as to the general character of Eg. seems to me acceptable. It avoids the difficulties which must be faced by any such views as that Eg. was part of any lost Apocryphal Gospel known to us, that it proceeded from any heretical sect, that it was a collection of excerpts, or that it was in any kind or degree a harmony of the canonical Gospels. His suggestion that its sources were independent of them and still more his view as to the relation between it and John are more disputable; but he has at least re-opened a question which some scholars seem rather too hastily to have assumed to be closed, and he has made interesting suggestions which deserve careful and critical consideration from those competent to pronounce on such matters. His book shows wide reading, painstaking scholarship, and rare critical discernment, and can be cordially recommended to those interested in the subject.

ANOTHER PARALLEL TO THE MAENADISM OF THE BACCHAE: HASIDISM IN MODERN JEWRY

E. R. Dodds, in his article "Maenadism in the Bacchae," [1] notes a number of parallels in other cults to the Dionysiac practices mentioned in Euripides' Bacchae. His list of parallels, while long, is by no means intended to be exhaustive; and it is proposed here to point out still another — the dancing and ecstasy characteristic of that unique movement in modern Jewry known as Hasidism.[2]

Briefly, Hasidism began in Poland with Rabbi Israel ben Eliezer (c. 1698–c. 1759), known as the "Ba'al Shem-Tob" ("The Good Master of the Name") [3] or, abbreviated, the "Besht." To the Eastern European Jews leading dark, wretched existences, the Ba'al Shem proclaimed that prayer performed with joy and ecstasy would bring about man's unity with God. The Jews during this period had shown an increasing emphasis in their academies on "Pilpul" (i.e. legalistic disputes on minute points of the Talmud) to the neglect of the emotional element in religion. But the new movement, without introducing any totally new elements into Jewish thought, brought new life through dancing and melody to the formal, dry worship. The Besht and his followers understood literally the verse from the Psalm, "All my bones shall say: 'Lord, who is like unto Thee . . . ?'" [4] The Ba'al Shem's great-grandson, Rabbi Naḥman of Bratzlav (1770–1811), taught that there was a special rhythm corresponding to every part of the body. Characteristic is his dictum that "as melody brought out the beauty in poetry, the dance brought it to a climax." [5]

Though the enthusiasm shown by the Hasidim in prayer does not in

[1] Harvard Theological Review, XXXIII (1940), pp. 155 ff.

[2] "Hasid" is the Hebrew word for a pious person. This movement is not to be confused with that of the Hasidim (Assideans) of Maccabean times. Nor does it have any connection with medieval Hasidism, though both are epochs in the development of Kabbalistic thought. Cf. on this latter point G. G. Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (Jerusalem, 1941), pp. 117–118. For a bibliography on the subject of modern Hasidism, cf. Scholem, pp. 426–428. The most authoritative treatments are by S. M. Dubnow, Geschichte des Chassidismus, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1931); by S. A. Horodezky, Ha-Ḥasidut veha-Ḥasidim, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1922); and by S. Schechter, Studies in Judaism (New York, 1896), I, 1–45. In English, the most complete study is an unpublished work by I. J. Kazis, Hasidism: a Study in the Sociology and History of Religion from the Beginning of the Movement (1740) until 1804 (Harvard Univ. Diss., 1939), which also contains an extensive bibliography.

[3] "Ba'al Shem was the traditional title of a miracle-worker.

[4] Ps. 35:10.

[5] D. Lapson, "The Chassidic Dance," The Dance Observer, IV (1937), p. 109.

intensity approach that of the Maenads in the Bacchae, still the underlying spirit is similar. The Koretzer — the Hasidic leaders were known by the cities where they preached — for example, is once said to have remarked: "Gold and silver become purified through fire. If you feel no sense of improvement after your prayer, you are either made of base metal, or your prayer lacked heat." [6]

Again, the tale is told of Rabbi Feibush Hobnover, who possessed such a fiercely burning desire to serve God that he fell dead while praying.[7]

The *ὀρειβασία*,[8] the mountain-dancing of the Maenads, is one of the prominent features of the Dionysiac worship portrayed in the Bacchae. As Huxley [9] remarks: "It is with their muscles that they most easily obtain knowledge of the divine." Similarly, pronounced bodily movements [10] and dancing, in which the Zaddik (Hasidic leader) [11] himself frequently joined, assumed a prominent part in the Hasidic ritual. Many Zaddikim, especially in Galicia, became well known for the originality and fervor displayed in their dancing. "The reality of life," says Horodezky,[12] "became as nothing to them; they forgot everything, turned round and round for hour after hour, and felt no fatigue." [13]

Dvora Lapson, a professional dancer herself, has described the Hasidic dance as follows: "At first, the forearm is used in quick, choppy movements from the elbow out. . . . As the Hasid warms up to his dance, with his feet raising him high in quick, jerky jumps and leaps, the arms — from finger to shoulder — begin to function very freely in ex-

[6] Phinehas of Koretz, Nofet Ẓufim, p. 49. Translated by L. I. Newman and S. Spitz, The Hasidic Anthology (New York, 1934), p. 525.

[7] A. S. B. Michelson, Ohel Naftali (Warsaw, 1911), pp. 107–108. Translated by Newman and Spitz, op. cit., p. 328. Ordinarily, however, the Hasidim avoided such extremes. Cf., e.g., Aaron b. Zebi Hirsch Cohen, Keter Shem-Tob (Warsaw, s.a.), p. 38.

[8] See the *parodos*, ll. 64 ff.

[9] A. Huxley, Ends and Means (New York, 1937), p. 235.

[10] Cf. D. Lapson, "Dance," Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, III, p. 460, who notes that the Hasidic followers of Rabbi Aaron of Karlin (d. 1792) in Poland gained the nickname of "Kullyikes" ("Rollers") from their habit of rolling in dance rhythm on the ground before morning prayers. Cf. also Kazis, Hasidism, p. 217, who quotes Zawwa'at ha-Ribash (Warsaw, 1913), p. 11: "Man must first arouse himself through his body. . . . Afterwards he will be able to worship through thought only, without the movements of his body."

[11] Lit., "the righteous one," colloquially called "Rebbe," from the Hebrew Rabbi.

[12] S. A. Horodezky, Leaders of Hasidism (English trans. by M. Horodezky-Magasanik, London, 1928, p. 134).

[13] Cf. the description of the dancing of the Bacchae in the *parodos* of Euripides' play. Similarly, Cadmus and Tiresias, despite their old age, are not too tired to join in the dance (l. 184).

pressive movements. His elbows, which cling close to his shrunken body in his daily life, are suddenly released and his arms are stretched upward in dramatic, meaningful gesticulations while his usually lowered head is raised and thrown back." [14]

At Simchath Torah (the festival of the Rejoicing of the Law) everyone, including the Zaddik, had a grand time. Dvora Lapson, during her visit to Poland in 1937, was particularly impressed with the Simchath Torah dance of one of the Galician Zaddikim from Melitz. "With his eyes closed and his face glowing with ecstasy, he led the joyous dance procession of the Torahs. The procession slowed down many times as the Zaddik danced four steps forward, four steps back, swaying the tremendous scroll from right to left as if it were as light as a prayer book. Wide-eyed Hasidim followed with their Torahs in simple steps, and bending of knees to the rhythm of the music. Following the replacing of the Torahs in the Ark, the Zaddik embraced his nearest disciple in a dance of joy. They were joined by another and another, swinging around with quick steps. Among them was an old man over a hundred years. With halting steps and hands held high, he followed his Zaddik, proud to be so close to him. When steps failed him, he followed with his eyes." [15]

The Hasidim developed ecstatic dances for various occasions. For example, they welcomed the Queen Sabbath every Friday afternoon with a particularly joyous dance around the banquet table.[16] Contrary to the custom of non-Hasidic Jews, there were even dances to celebrate the anniversary of the death of a Zaddik. Dvora Lapson [17] has described the great abandon which she observed in the dancing of elderly Hasidim in Palestine at the tomb of Rabbi Simeon ben Yoḥai, the reputed father of the Kabbala.

One finds both in the choruses of the Bacchae and in the sayings of the Hasidim the same impelling force of the Dionysiac joy in life. Thus, in short, it is as if the Besht were a veritable Dionysus invading the staid domains of Apollo almost in the very center of the latter's strongholds.

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[14] D. Lapson, "The Chassidic Dance," The Dance Observer, IV (1937), p. 109.
[15] Ibid., p. 110.
[16] Cf. D. Lapson, "Dancing," Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, III, p. 460, who notes that during the late Middle Ages, Kabbalists of Safed in Palestine similarly welcomed the Queen Sabbath with processions and dances over the hills of Galilee.
[17] D. Lapson, "The Chassidic Dance," op. cit., p. 110.

THE MIDDLE PERSIAN INSCRIPTION AT SAR MASHHAD

In 1924 Herzfeld discovered the largest (in size) Middle Persian inscription extant, near the village of Sar Mashhad in the province of Fārs. It was never published, and in the summer of 1948 when in Iran I made a trip to the site. The literary remains of Herzfeld, with which I had been occupied, gave scant detail about the location and condition of the inscription, but with the aid of local people, especially Muhammad Ilani of the village of Balādeh, I was able to find and copy the inscription.

The inscription is graven on the side of a mountain above a bas-relief of Bahram II, who is in the act of piercing a lion with his sword. Behind him stand his queen and two courtiers. The inscription is in a poor state of preservation, while the bas-relief is in a much better condition.

While the village of Sar Mashhad is the only settlement in the valley, surrounded by mountains and quite inaccessible for any wheeled vehicles, there are many indications of a more flourishing past. Muslim geographers tell of numerous fire temples in this area late into Islamic times. The interesting book of the late tenth century author al-Kāzarūnī, Firdaus al-muršidiya, tells of the difficulties experienced by Muslims in building mosques in the province of Fārs due to the hostility of the majority of "fire-worshippers." [1]

The inscription was carved by order of Kartīr, the mobadan mobad of the Sasanian monarchs Hormizd I, Bahram I and II, and possibly of Shapur I. He was certainly only at the beginning of his rise to power under the last-named. Kartīr was also the author of several inscriptions near Persepolis, on the so-called Ka'bah of Zoroaster below the inscription of Shapur, on the mountain behind the horse of Shapur at Naqš-i-Rustam, and above the bas-relief of Ardešīr Papakan at Naqš-i-Rajab.[2]

One can readily understand why the high priest would have carved his inscriptions in the Persepolis area, replete as it was with traditions

[1] This book was edited by Fritz Meier to be published in the series Bibliotheca Islamica (Leipzig-Istanbul, 1942). The edition was completely destroyed in Leipzig by bombs, not one copy having been saved. I used the proofs which Hellmut Ritter had.

[2] A regular edition, with text and translation, of the Ka'bah of Zoroaster inscriptions has not yet been made, but cf. M. Sprengling, "Kartīr, Founder of Sasanian Zoroastrianism," AJSL 57 (1940) 197–228. The inscriptions of Naqš-i-Rustam and Naqš-i-Rajab were published in the monumental work of Herzfeld, Paikuli (Berlin, 1924).

of royalty. The tombs of the Achaemenian kings were there, and possibly Naqš-i-Rajab was the place of crowning the Sasanian kings. Why did Kartīr have an inscription in praise of himself engraved on the mountain at Sar Mashhad? R. Ghirshman, director of the French archaeological expedition in Iran, told me that in the vicinity of every royal Sasanian sculpture on the side of a mountain there was to be found a man-made cave. Ghirshman supposed that these caves were the resting places of the Sasanian monarchs. At Sar Mashhad there is a hole in the mountain some distance above the inscription. This may have been the tomb of Bahram II, under whom Kartīr reached his apogee. The ruins of a city on the plain at the base of the mountain might have been the royal city of Bahram II, or possibly the home town of Kartīr himself.

The first part of the inscription at Sar Mashhad is a copy of the inscription of Kartīr at the Ka'bah of Zoroaster, while the end of it is a copy of the inscription of Kartīr at Naqš-i-Rajab. The center of the inscription, the most damaged part, is of considerable interest in that it seems to contain the title of Kartīr, which follows his name, and may be transcribed χnγlpy. The significance of this word (or words) is unknown, but it shows that Kartīr is certainly a name and not a title. The inscription is not as important as might be supposed from the various references which Herzfeld made to it, but new words are encountered which will add to our knowledge of Middle Persian. The historical or religious significance of the inscription will not be so great, but nevertheless of sufficient importance to warrant its early publication.

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